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INTRODUCTION

State constitutional Blaine Amendments,1 which prohibit the
expenditure of state funds on religious educational institutions, have
†
Richard Komer is a senior attorney at the Institute for Justice in Arlington,
Virginia, where he litigates educational choice cases. He has an A.B. from Harvard
College and a J.D. from the University of Virginia Law School.
1. What is a Blaine Amendment?, FINDLAW, http://education.findlaw.com/curr
iculum-standards-school-funding/what-is-a-blaine-amendment.html (last visited
Nov. 17, 2017). The Blaine Amendments get their name from Congressman James
Blaine, who attempted to pass a federal amendment to prohibit the funding of
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for decades impeded educational choice programs2 This may be
changing. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Trinity
Lutheran v. Comer3 opened the door for school choice programs to
survive challenge under state Blaine Amendments. Both the majority
opinion of six justices4 and the dissenting opinion of two justices5
disclaim any conclusion concerning any programs beyond the
particular program at issue in Trinity Lutheran. However, two
concurring justices signal the broader implications of the decision,6
as does the Court’s action in vacating and remanding two pending
decisions involving Blaine Amendments in the Colorado and New
Mexico Constitutions.7 Given the prevalence of Blaine Amendments
in state constitutions8 and the inhibiting effect given to some of
religious schools in 1875. Id.
2. What is School Choice?, AM. SCH. CHOICE, http://americanschoolchoice.
com/what-is-school-choice/definition/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2018). “Educational
choice programs” are programs that provide scholarships that allow parents to
choose from an array of educational options for their children’s education. Id.
Typically, these programs are of two types: (1) those that provide scholarships
directly from a government source, and (2) those that provide scholarships from
private 501(c)(3) scholarship organizations that receive donations generated by
state tax credits. Parents can use these scholarships to pay private school tuition and,
sometimes, out-of-district public school tuition. Id. Recently, a new form of program
has become popular, in which government funds or funds generated by state tax
credits provide educational savings accounts to eligible families. Id.
3. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012
(2017).
4. Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion in which Justices Alito,
Kagan, and Kennedy joined completely, and in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch
joined except for footnote 3. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2016. Footnote 3
addressed the implications of the majority’s decision for other programs. Id. at 2024
n.3.
5. Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissent that was joined by Justice Ginsburg,
which noted in footnote 2 that the majority’s opinion did not address “indirect aid
programs in which aid reaches religious institutions ‘only as result of the genuine
and independent choices of private individuals.’” Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2029
n.2 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,
649 (2002)).
6. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (Thomas, J., concurring in part); id.
at 2025–26 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
7. Moses v. Skandera, 367 P.3d 838 (N.M. 2015), vacated sub nom. New Mexico
Ass’n of Non-Pub. Sch. v. Moses, 137 S. Ct. 2325 (2017); Taxpayers for Pub. Educ.
v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 461 (Colo. 2015), vacated sub nom. Doyle v.
Taxpayers for Pub. Educ., 137 S. Ct. 2324 (2017).
8. Thirty-seven state constitutions have one or more Blaine Amendments.
ALA. CONST. art. VII, § 1; ALASKA CONST. art. 7, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12; id. art.
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those provisions by their state supreme courts,9 Trinity Lutheran’s
potential to lead to a limiting change in the interpretation of those
Blaine Amendments could profoundly affect educational choice
programs.
This article will first explain what state Blaine Amendments are
and why they came to be in so many state constitutions.10 Far from
being a benign form of protection for secular public schools, Blaine
Amendments were enacted to deny aid to Catholic schools at a time
when public schools were generically Protestant.11 Then, this article
will discuss how differing interpretations of state Blaine
Amendments affect educational choice programs.12 In doing so, this
article will categorize the current interpretations of those provisions
into three types: (1) those that permit educational choice programs,
(2) those that inhibit educational choice programs, and (3) those
that give insufficient guidance to place the interpretation into either
of the first two categories.13 This article will next describe the efforts
to get cases like Trinity Lutheran to the United States Supreme Court,
including two prior cases addressing state Blaine Amendments from
Missouri14 and Washington15 This will include a particular focus on

IX, § 10; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8; id. art. XVI, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 34; id. art.
IX, § 7; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 3; FLA CONST. art. I, § 3; GA. CONST. art. I, § II, ¶ I;
HAW. CONST. art X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 3; IND. CONST.
art. I, § 6; KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 6(c); KY. CONST. § 184; MASS. CONST. amend. art.
XVIII, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4; id. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; id. art.
XIII, §2; MISS. CONST. art. VIII § 208; MO. CONST. art. I, § 7; id. art. IX, § 8; MONT.
CONST. art. X, § 6; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H. CONST.
pt. II, art. LXXXIII; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 3; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3; N.D. CONST.
art. VIII, § 5; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5; OR. CONST. art. I § 5; PENN. CONST. art. 3,
§ 15; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; id. art. VIII, § 16; TEX. CONST.
art. I, §7; id. art. VII, § 5(c); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4; id. art. X, § 9; VA. CONST. art.
IV, §16; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; id. art. IX, § 4; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18; WYO. CONST.
art. 1, § 19; id. art. 3, § 36. See generally RICHARD D. KOMER & CLARK NEILY, SCHOOL
CHOICE AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A GUIDE TO DESIGNING SCHOOL CHOICE
PROGRAMS (2007) (listing the relevant text of state constitutions’ Blaine
Amendments), https://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/school_choice/50staterep
ort/50stateSCreport.pdf.
9. See infra Part II.C.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See id.
12. See infra Part II.C.
13. Id.
14. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
15. Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
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2004’s Locke v. Davey,16 which involved an educational choice
program.17 This article will then provide detailed discussion of
Trinity Lutheran itself, and end with a consideration of the decision’s
likely effect on future application of state Blaine Amendments.18
This article concludes that Trinity Lutheran has the potential to
eliminate state Blaine Amendments as impediments to educational
choice programs.19
II. STATE BLAINE AMENDMENTS
Thirty-seven state constitutions contain Blaine Amendments.20
Although their language varies considerably, particularly in scope,
they all share one essential characteristic: they prohibit units of state
government from providing aid to “sectarian” or “denominational”
schools.21 Nowadays we think of “sectarian” and “denominational”
schools as synonyms for “religious schools”; this is a critical mistake.
At the time these provisions were adopted, virtually all schools—
public as well as private—were “religious schools” as we use the term
today.22 Until quite recently, there was a consensus that religion and
morality were an essential component of education because both
promoted the virtues thought to be necessary for effective
citizenship in a democratic republic.23
16. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
17. See infra Part III.A.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
20. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2037; see also KOMER & NEILY, supra note 8,
at 4.
21. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2038. Blaine Amendments arose in
reaction to Catholic demands for government funding of their parochial schools,
but Catholics also created other religious institutions, including hospitals and
orphanages, and some Blaine Amendments also extend to those sorts of religious
institutions. Richard G. Bacon, Rum, Romanism and Romer: Equal Protection and the
Blaine Amendment in State Constitutions, 6 DEL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003). For example,
Nevada’s Blaine Amendment, adopted in 1880, was passed in reaction to the state
providing a grant to the state’s first orphanage, which was Catholic. See State v.
Hallock, 16 Nev. 373 (Nev. 1882) (applying NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 10). Many Blaine
Amendments extend beyond prohibiting aid to religious schools by prohibiting aid
to religious institutions in general. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“No public
money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship,
exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment . . . .”).
22. See Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 38, 45 (1992).
23. Id.
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The Protestant Public Schools and Proto-Blaines

Protestant ministers played a leading role in the creation and
supervision of public schools.24 Educational historian David Tyack
and his coauthors explain:
Protestant ministers and lay people were in the forefront of
the public school crusade and took a proprietary interest
in the institution they had helped to build. They assumed
a congruence of purpose between the common school and
the Protestant churches. They had trouble conceiving of
moral education not grounded in religion . . . . To say the
schools were “nonsectarian” was not to imply that they were
without religion. Rather, it meant that the Protestant
churches agreed to suspend their denominational quarrels
within the public schoolhouse.25
For these advocates, public schools were essential to achieving a
successful republic.26 Even before the Constitution became effective
in 1789, the Confederation Congress passed the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787,27 which contained the following language in
article three: “Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to
good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the
means of education shall forever be encouraged.”28
After the Constitution became effective, the First Congress
reissued the Northwest Ordinance substantially unchanged.29 The
Northwest Ordinance, and the Land Ordinance of 1785, laid the
foundation for federal support of education by setting aside one 640-

24. See DAVID TYACK, THOMAS JAMES & AARON BENAVOT, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF
AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785-1954, 162 (1987).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. The formal name of the Northwest Ordinance is “An Ordinance for the
Governance of the Territory of the United States, North-west of the River Ohio.”
Five states (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin) and part of a sixth
(Minnesota) were formed from the Northwest Territory subject to the Ordinance,
and their state constitutions reflect the language of the Ordinance to varying
degrees. 2 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND
COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 957–62
(1909).
28. Id. at 961.
29. See Reginald Horsman, The Northwest Ordinance and the Shaping of an
Expanding American Republic, 73 WIS. MAG. HIST. 21, 21–32 (1989).
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acre section of every township for the support of schools.30 The
revenue generated from these lands became the “common school
funds” that supported (and continue to support) the public schools
in all states created after the date of the Northwest Ordinance.31
Some of the original thirteen states created similar funds to support
the common or public schools, such as the “state literary funds” of
North Carolina32 and Virginia.33 Thus, the government was
financially supporting schools in part because they promoted the
“religion, morality, and knowledge . . . necessary to good
government.”34
It is anachronistic thinking to believe that the early public or
common schools were secular institutions.35 While we are familiar
with the thoroughly secular schools of today, the early proponents
of public education would be horrified by these same secular
schools. From Horace Mann and Henry Barnard through the
beginnings of the twentieth century, religion—specifically a
nondenominational Protestantism—was regarded as an essential
component of a public education.36 Bible reading in the public
30. ELLWOOD PATTERSON CUBBERLEY, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
A STUDY AND INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL HISTORY 92 (1919).
31. Id. at 92–94. In dedicating public land to the support of schools and
colleges, the Northwest Ordinance followed the longstanding practice of the
colonial governments of the New England colonies, a practice that continued long
after Independence. Id.; see also RICHARD GABEL, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR CHURCH AND
PRIVATE SCHOOLS 174–75 (1937). Early governments were land rich and cash poor,
and providing land grants allowed schools to capitalize their operations by selling
off the land to build and maintain their structures. Id. To this day, Dartmouth
College, which was founded to train Congregationalist ministers and missionaries
to evangelize Native Americans, owns large swathes of land in northern New
Hampshire and Vermont. Id.
32. North Carolina first created a fund for the support of common schools in
the Literary Fund Law of 1825. See M.C.S. NOBLE, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
OF NORTH CAROLINA 45–46 (1930). This law is now incorporated into the North
Carolina Constitution in Article IX, section 6, entitled “State School Fund.” N.C.
CONST. art. IX, § 6.
33. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8.
34. THORPE, supra note 27, at 961.
35. See, e.g., CUBBERLEY, supra note 30, at 73 (“[T]he school everywhere in
America arose as a child of the Church.”).
36. See generally FREDERICK M. BINDER, THE AGE OF THE COMMON SCHOOLS:
1830–1865 (1974); CHARLES L. GLENN, THE MYTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL (1988)
(examining the notion that the state should sponsor and control the education of
its citizens to mold a common community with common loyalties); STANLEY K.
SCHULTZ, THE CULTURE FACTORY: BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1789–1860 (1973)
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schools was commonplace, mandated by law in many states and by
custom in others.37 Indeed, after 1900, eleven states and the District
of Columbia passed statutes requiring Bible reading in the public
schools: Pennsylvania in 1913, Delaware and Tennessee in 1915, New
Jersey in 1916, Alabama in 1919, Georgia in 1921, Maine in 1923,
Kentucky in 1924, Florida and Idaho in 1925, the District of
Columbia in 1926, and Arkansas in 1930.38 Such enactments
formalized the longstanding practices of the public schools and were
themselves a reaction to pressure for secularization of the public
schools.
The centrality of Bible reading to Protestant religious practice
is captured by the phrase sola Scriptura, meaning “by scripture alone.”
Norman Geisler and Ralph McKenzie state that:
By sola Scriptura Protestants mean that Scripture alone is
the primary and absolute source for all doctrine and
practice (faith and morals). Sola Scriptura implies several
things. First, the Bible is a direct revelation from God. As
such, it has divine authority. For what the Bible says, God
says.39
This view of the singular authority of scripture motivates much
of the Protestant effort to translate the Bible into vernacular
languages (e.g., from Latin to English) and to distribute it widely.40
Protestants generally believe all Christians should read the Bible for
themselves and evaluate what they have been taught on the basis of
it.41
Indeed, the earliest public school law in the United States,
Massachusetts’ “Old Deluder Satan Act” of 1647, makes explicit the
link between the need for education and the reading of the Bible.42

(taking a pessimistic view of Boston’s early public schools, where children were
“processed” and conditioned to promote the security and stability of a social order
under the control of an urban elite).
37. See Michael D. Newsom, Common School Religion: Judicial Narratives in a
Protestant Empire, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 219, 243 (2002).
38. TYACK, ET AL., supra note 24, at 165.
39. NORMAN L. GEISLER & RALPH E. MACKENZIE, WHAT THINK YE OF ROME? (PART
THREE): THE CATHOLIC-PROTESTANT DEBATE ON BIBLICAL AUTHORITY 2 (1994),
http://www.equip.org/PDF/DC170-3.pdf.
40. See W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, INTRODUCTION TO PROTESTANTISM, 1
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 1:12 (March 2017 Update).
41. See id.
42. The Old Deluder Satan Act (1647), in 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND
COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 203 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff

558

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:2

The act reads in part: “It being one of the chief project[s] of that old
deluder, Satan, to keep men from the knowledge of the Scriptures,
as in former times keeping them in an unknown tongue.”43 The act
required townships with at least fifty households to appoint and pay
a teacher to teach the local children to read and write, and all towns
with at least one hundred households to set up and maintain a
grammar school.44 This Protestant orientation of the public schools
continued well into the twentieth century45 and spawned serious
educational, political, and legal controversies with the growing
Catholic minority.46
Many of these controversies were triggered by Protestant
exercises in the public schools, particularly the requirements for
reading the King James Bible.47 For example, the earliest landmark
decision on Bible reading came from the Maine Supreme Court in
1854.48 The Ellsworth school committee expelled a fifteen-year-old
Catholic girl, Amanda Donahoe, who refused to read from the King
James Bible on the advice of her priest and the order of her father.49
ed., 1853).
43. Id.
44. Id.; see also ELLWOOD P. CUBBERLEY, READINGS IN PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: A COLLECTION OF SOURCES AND READINGS TO ILLUSTRATE THE HISTORY
OF EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE AND PROGRESS IN THE UNITED STATES 18–19 (1934).
45. See KARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1780–1860, 98 (1983) (“Education officials, legislators, and
essayists agreed on the propriety of Bible reading in the public schools.
Predominantly Protestant themselves, they endorsed the notion that there was a
common core of scripture and belief among Christians, and they had no qualms
about supporting a common-school policy that was openly Christian, avowedly
nonsectarian, and implicitly Protestant.”). See generally LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE
STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL: 1825–1925 (1987) (tracing the evolution of
public and non-public schools).
46. TYACK ET AL., supra note 24, at 163 (“Throughout most of American History,
local majorities seemed to have had their way with religious elements in the
curriculum. These local majorities were typically Protestant, and the ‘compromise’
they most favored—teaching the King James Bible without comment—was hardly
fair to Catholics, Jews, or non-believers.”).
47. See id. at 162–63. This book also notes that “[c]ases upholding bible reading
outnumbered those declaring it sectarian and unconstitutional by roughly five to
one.” Id. at 163.
48. Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (Me. 1854).
49. Id. The decision is marked in a lengthy discussion of the various versions of
the Bible, but the Court’s mask slips when it states:
Large masses of foreign population are among us, weak in the midst of
our strength. Mere citizenship is of no avail, unless they imbibe the
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As a more deadly example, the anti-Catholic Bible Riots in
Philadelphia in 1844 were triggered by rumors spread by nativists
that Catholics were demanding the removal of the Bible from the
public schools.50 The riots left more than twenty dead and several
Catholic churches in ashes.51
The hostility of the public schools to Catholics and Catholicism
was not limited to reading the Protestant Bible and singing
Protestant hymns. Professor Jorgenson writes:
[P]assages offensive to Catholics were liberally sprinkled
throughout many of the most widely used schoolbooks of
the period. Professor Elson, in her excellent study, makes
(although she does not document) a sobering statement:
“No theme in these schoolbooks before 1870 is more
universal than anti-Catholicism.” That the Roman Church
supported absolutist government to the detriment of the
common people, that its policy was to keep the masses in
ignorance, that it forbade its members to read the Bible,
that the French and Spanish explorers were motivated by
avarice and cruelty while the English sought to convert and
civilize those whom they found in darkness—such
assertions were common in antebellum textbooks,
especially in readers, histories, and geographies.52

liberal spirit of our laws and institutions, unless they become citizens in
fact as well as in name. In no other way can the process of assimilation
be so readily and thoroughly accomplished as through the medium of
the public schools, which are alike open to the children of the rich and
the poor, of the stranger and the citizen.
Id. at 413. After the decision, the Donahoe family’s priest, Father John Bapst, was
tarred and feathered, run out of town on a rail, and threatened with being burned
at the stake; the chapel he had officiated in was also set on fire. Fr. John Bapst
Survives Tar & Feathers, Becomes 1st Boston College President, NEW ENGLAND HIST.
SOC’Y, http://www.newenglandhistoricalsociety.com/fr-john-bapst-survives-tar-fath
ers-becomes-1st-boston-college-president/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). A formerly
Catholic high school in Bangor, Maine and the library at Boston College are named
for him. Evangeline Hussey, John Bapst High School, MAINE HISTORY ONLINE
https://www.mainememory.net/sitebuilder/site/1390/page/2041/Display (last
accessed Apr. 2, 2018); Campus Guide, BOSTON COLLEGE, https://www.bc.
edu/offices/historian/resources/guide.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
50. See Newsom, supra note 37, at 242.
51. See MICHAEL FELDBERG, THE PHILADELPHIA BIBLE RIOTS OF 1844, 110, 156
(1975).
52. JORGENSON, supra note 45, at 60–61 (quoting RUTH MILLER ELSON,
GUARDIANS OF TRADITION: AMERICAN SCHOOLBOOKS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 53
(Lincoln: Univ. of Neb. Press, 1964)).
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It is no small wonder that, faced with the hostility of the public
schools to its faith, the Catholic Church was determined to create its
own schools.53 Professor Tyack and his co-authors summarize the
development as follows:
Enraged by compulsory reading of the King James Bible
and by textbooks that derogated Catholicism and often the
lands from which Catholic immigrants had come, Catholics
in many communities came to believe that they must build
their own school system. It was only just, they said, that they
receive public money to do so.54
The Catholic Church increasingly demanded equal treatment
of its schools. This triggered a backlash that resulted in states
enacting Blaine Amendments.55 Many Catholic immigrants came
from Ireland and Canada, where government-supported dual school
systems for Protestants and Catholics were common.56 Catholics
sought similar accommodations in the United States, and the
Protestant establishment responded to these demands in several
different ways.
For instance, Protestants made efforts to require that all
children attend public schools.57 This would have effectively ended
private education at the elementary and possibly secondary school
level and forced all children of whatever faith to attend the
nondenominationally Protestant public schools. Jorgenson has
detailed the efforts to achieve this result by statute in Massachusetts,
Illinois, and Wisconsin.58 Although public school advocates were
initially successful in getting these laws passed, once their effects

53. See Aisling Maloney, Heroic Effort: The History of Catholic Schools in America,
HUMANUM (2015), http://humanumreview.com/articles/heroic-effort-the-historyof-catholic-schools-in-america (discussing that public schools “threaten[ed] to
alienate Catholic children from their religious, cultural, and familial heritage,”
which led to the creation of Catholic schools).
54. TYACK ET AL., supra note 24, at 163–64.
55. See Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine
Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
551, 565 (2003); Marie-Claire Considère-Charon, Protestant Schools in the Republic of
Ireland, 87 STUDIES: AN IRISH Q. REV. 345, 15–23 (1998).
56. See Brian Noonan, Saskatchewan Separate Schools, A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN
SASKATCHEWAN 21–23 (Noonan et al. eds., 2006). See generally Marie-Claire
Considère-Charon, Protestant Schools in the Republic of Ireland: Heritage, Image and
Concerns, 87 STUDIES: AN IRISH Q. REV. 345, 15–17 (1998).
57. See JORGENSON, supra note 45, at 20–30.
58. Id. at 162–204.
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became known, political opposition resulted in their repeal.59
Nonetheless, efforts to force all students to attend the generically
Protestant public schools continued, ultimately culminating in
passage of the Compulsory Education Act by referendum by the
voters of Oregon in 1922.60
Among the primary backers of the Oregon referendum was the
Ku Klux Klan.61 Although most Americans today know that the KKK
was anti-Black, few are aware that it was anti-Catholic and antiSemitic as well.62 It was its anti-Catholicism that led the KKK to
oppose Catholic schools and support efforts to make attending them
impossible.63
Two Oregon private schools immediately challenged in federal
court the constitutionality of the law requiring all students to attend
the public schools.64 One of the plaintiffs was a Catholic school and
the other was a private military school.65 In 1925, in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,66 the United States Supreme Court unanimously invalidated
the law, stating that “we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control.”67 In a ringing endorsement of parental liberty, the Court
continued:

59. See id. at 187–88.
60. See Michael J. Nove, Deliver Us from Evil: The Ku Klux Klan in Oregon’s Legal
History, 57 OR. ST. B. BULL. 37, 37 (Nov. 1996).
61. See id.
62. See id.; Encyclopedia Britannica, Ku Klux Klan, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
(Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Ku-Klux-Klan (“To the old
Klan’s hostility toward blacks the new Klan—which was strong in the Midwest as well
as in the South—added bias against Roman Catholics, Jews, foreigners, and
organized labour.”).
63. Nove, supra note 60 (“The national leadership of the KKK, spearheaded by
Indiana’s Grand Dragon, David Stephenson, saw opportunity in the proposed
school legislation: Oregon’s initiative process could be used to put the school bill
on the ballot, and once law, it would serve as a model for identical legislation in
other states. If successful, the KKK’s rabid anti-Catholic agenda would leap years
ahead in progress.”).
64. See Soc’y of Sisters v. Pierce, 296 F. 928, 930–31 (D. Or. 1924). This case
involved a Catholic School and a military academy challenging Pierce, the
then-governor of Oregon, on the constitutionality of Oregon’s law requiring
children ages eight to sixteen to attend public schools. Id.
65. Id.
66. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
67. Id. at 534–35.
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The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the state to standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.68
Of course, the right to direct a child’s destiny by choosing to
educate the child in a private school or at home depends on having
the financial resources to do so. As the cost of education has
skyrocketed, financial circumstances have forced more and more
families to use the “free” public schools.69 One major factor of the
increasing cost has been the increasing necessity of education, both
in terms of years of schooling and extension of the school year
itself.70 For example, while the Colorado Constitution’s education
article requires that public school districts provide three months of
education per year, Colorado state statute requires the standard nine
months of schooling per year.71
Pierce ended the efforts to force all children to attend generically
Protestant public schools,72 but this total defeat can be contrasted
with the total victory achieved in the second effort of the Protestant
establishment—that of rebuffing Catholic demands for equal
governmental aid for their schools.73 The response to these demands
was the state Blaine Amendments, which prevent states from

68. Id. at 535.
69. See Jack Jennings, Proportion of U.S. Students in Private Schools is 10 Percent and
Declining, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (May 28, 2013, 12:31 PM), https://www.huffingto
npost.com/jack-jennings/proportion-of-us-students_b_2950948.html.
70. See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, The College Degree Has Become the New High School
Degree, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/cat
herine-rampell-the-college-degree-has-become-the-new-high-school-degree/2014/
09/08/e935b68c-378a-11e4-8601-97ba88884ffd_story.html?utm_term=.10a9b372a2
a5 (discussing the impact of graduation inflation on decisions to pursue higher
education).
71. Compare COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (providing in part, “[o]ne or more public
schools shall be maintained in each school district within the state, at least three
months in each year; and any school district failing to have such a school shall not
be entitled to any portion of the school fund for that year”), with COLO. REV. STAT
§ 22-32-109(1)(n)(I) (2017).
72. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 532–33.
73. See DeForrest, supra note 55, at 562–63.
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providing institutional aid to “sectarian” schools.74 Effectively, Blaine
Amendments ensured that the Protestant public schools retained a
monopoly over institutional aid provided to schools.75
The state Blaine Amendments take their name from a failed
attempt to amend the Federal Constitution, as sponsored by
Congressman (and later Senator) James G. Blaine of Maine in 1875,
and were modeled on earlier state statutes and amendments to a
number of state constitutions.76 For example, the earliest protoBlaine Amendment is found in Michigan’s first state Constitution
enacted in 1835, which provided that “[n]o money shall be drawn
from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies or theological
or religious seminaries.”77 Wisconsin followed suit in 1840,78 and
Indiana in 1850.79 Massachusetts, the birthplace of American public
education, adopted a no-aid provision in 1855, at the height of the
Know Nothing movement, which controlled the legislature and
governorship in 1854.80 That same year, Illinois enacted legislation
prohibiting public aid to sectarian institutions.81 In 1855, California
did so as well.82
Blaine’s federal amendment would have imposed the noinstitutional-aid rule on all states, had it been adopted and ratified.83
With the federal amendment’s failure to achieve the requisite
supermajority in the Senate, the action moved back to the states, with
Congress encouraging, and sometimes requiring through

74. See id. at 559–561.
75. Id.
76. JORGENSON, supra note 45, at 101. According to Jorgenson, the provision
was repeated in expanded form in Michigan’s 1850 Constitution. Id.
77. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1835).
78. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18 (“. . . [N]or shall any money be drawn from the
treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological
seminaries.”).
79. IND. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, for the
benefit of any religious or theological institution.”).
80. JORGENSON, supra note 45, at 100.
81. Id. Jorgenson notes that the “immediate effect [of the legislation] was to
deal a staggering blow to non-public schools of the state,” with the state
superintendent of public instruction reporting “with obvious gratification,” that in
just two years the Free School System “has nearly swept the entire field of the
thousands of Private schools which then existed.” Id.
82. Id. at 106.
83. See 4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875), as reprinted in JORGENSON, supra note 45, at
138–39.
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legislation, new states to include provisions to this effect.84 Indeed,
all states entering the Union after the federal amendment’s failure
in 1876 have included Blaine Amendments in their state
constitutions,85 and have been joined by some of the older states as
well86
The “proto-Blaines” (the state constitutional amendments that
predate the failed federal Blaine Amendment), the federal Blaine
Amendment, and the state Blaine Amendments incorporated after
the federal Amendment failed, all share a common principle and a
common motivation. All Blaines prevent institutional aid to sectarian
schools and make it impossible for any state legislature (and usually
any other governmental body in the state) to treat sectarian schools
equally with public schools. In other words, they rebuff the demands
of the Catholic Church for equal aid for its schools, take the matter
out of the hands of the legislatures, and necessitate an amendment
to the state constitution to permit such aid.87
The adoption of most of the proto-Blaines coincides with the
arrival of substantial numbers of Catholic immigrants in the United
States, beginning in the 1840s.88 Until the Irish potato famines of the
84. JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 153 (1999). According to Professor Viteritti, the
enabling legislation under which Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Washington became states required they include Blaine Amendments
in their state constitutions. Id.
85. Those states are: Colorado, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana,
Washington, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Arizona, Alaska, and
Hawaii.
86. Among those states are New Hampshire, New York, and Pennsylvania from
the original thirteen states.
87. To date, only Louisiana has removed a Blaine Amendment from its state
constitution, which was done in the course of passage of a new constitution in 1973.
See KOMER & NEILY, supra note 8, at 38. A number of other states have amended their
Blaine Amendments to overrule restrictive decisions of their supreme courts. See,
e.g., DEL. CONST. art. X, § 5 (amended to provide transportation of private school
students); IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5 (amended to allow financing of private health
facilities); MASS. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2 (amended to allow higher education grants
to students); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (amended to allow transportation of private
school students); S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 20 (amended to allow loaning free
textbooks to private school students); VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 11 (to allow grants to
higher education students in private colleges). Michigan, in response to an advisory
opinion of its supreme court justices, is the only state to tighten the restrictions of
its Blaine Amendment. MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
88. JORGENSON, supra note 45, at 69–70. See generally MICHAEL BARONE, SHAPING
OUR NATION: HOW SURGES OF MIGRATION TRANSFORMED AMERICA AND ITS POLITICS
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1840s, Catholic immigration to the United States was modest.89
During this decade, the Catholic population tripled following the
arrival of more than 700,000 Catholics.90
This was not the beginning of anti-Catholicism. AntiCatholicism in the United States predates the arrival of substantial
numbers of Catholics, dating all the way back to the British
colonies.91 Indeed, due not only to the religious strife within
England between Catholics and Protestants (resolved in favor of the
Protestants), but also to the fact that Britain’s primary competitors
in the New World were Catholic France and Catholic Spain, hostility
to Catholics ran deep.92 The original constitutions of several states
excluded Catholics from holding state office by requiring office
holders to be Protestants.93
Nonetheless, Protestant influence in the public schools caused
growing controversy as the Catholic population increased, which led
to efforts to establish Catholic schools.94 Professor Viteritti notes that
by the middle of the nineteenth century, “[c]hurch leaders in
Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, Cincinnati, Baltimore, San
Francisco, and St. Paul all began to lobby their state legislatures for
public funds to create their own school systems.”95 This was in
addition to New York City, where such efforts began in the early
1840s.96 By 1852, the Catholics’ patience had run out for efforts to
106–15 (2013) (detailing Catholic immigration in the nineteenth century).
89. See BARONE, supra note 88, at 107.
90. JORGENSON, supra note 45, at 69–70.
91. See Mark S. Massa, The New and Old Anti-Catholicism and the Analogical
Imagination, 62 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 549, 558 (2001) (describing early fears of
Catholic intrusion in Colonial America). Maryland, founded under a charter given
to the Catholic Calvert family, is the principal exception to the rule that the colonies
were Protestant in orientation. See Yale L. Sch., The Charter of Maryland: 1632, THE
AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ma01.asp (last visited
Apr. 2, 2018) (making no mention of Protestant religion).
92. See D.G. PAZ, POPULAR ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN MID-VICTORIAN ENGLAND
299–300 (Stanford Univ. Press 1992).
93. For example, Part II of the New Hampshire Constitution of 1783 required
that officeholders be of the Protestant religion. See SUSAN E. MARSHALL, THE NEW
HAMPSHIRE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE, 227–46 (2004) (providing the
text of the 1783 New Hampshire Constitution). These provisions were repealed in
1876, after being declared a dead letter by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in
Hale v. Everett, the year the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. 53 N.H. 9 (1868).
94. See, e.g., JORGENSON, supra note 45, at 83–85.
95. VITERITTI, supra note 84, at 151.
96. Id.
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achieve accommodation within the public schools, and the First
Baltimore Plenary Council exhorted the Catholic bishops to
establish schools connected to all the churches of their dioceses.97
This energized Catholic efforts to obtain public aid for parochial
schools, which in turn engendered an even more powerful response
from the Protestant majority.98
Efforts to deny any aid to Catholic schools was part and parcel
of a strong hostility towards immigrants in general and Catholics in
particular.99 A few years before education reformer Horace Mann
opened his first public school in 1837, a Protestant mob, egged on
by Reverend Lyman Beecher’s inflammatory sermons, set fire to the
Ursuline Convent in Charlestown, Massachusetts.100 The mob
declared the act was “because Catholics had dared to protest Bible
reading and prayer recitals in the public schools.”101 Similar
Protestant fears of rumored Catholic efforts to ban the Bible in
Philadelphia public schools led to the deadly Bible Riots of 1844.102
The twin strands of nativism and anti-Catholicism spawned
numerous political parties in the 1840s before coalescing into the
Know Nothing movement of the 1850s.103 Emerging from the ashes
of the Whig party, the Know Nothings (officially the American
Republican or American party),104 became a powerful political force
in the mid-1850s.105 Professor Jorgenson notes that the Know
97. See generally JORGENSON, supra note 45, at 83–145 (exploring the nature of
and resistance to the “school question” in the major regions of the United States, as
well as the implementation and effects of the establishment of Catholic parochial
schools from 1852–1885).
98. Id. at 85. Jorgenson concludes that: “[t]he Catholic school campaign
ushered in by the education decree of the 1852 Plenary Council . . . had a twofold
objective: to expand markedly the numbers of schools attached to parishes, and to
renew and intensify efforts to secure public funds for these schools. This was the
Catholic response to the Protestant Common School Movement.” Id.
99. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (1955) (detailing immigration patterns and nativist activity
against foreign immigration); RAY BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE,
1800–1860: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM (1938) (cataloging how
anti-Catholicism developed in protest groups).
100. VITERITTI, supra note 84, at 149.
101. Id.
102. See FELDBERG supra note 51.
103. MICHAEL FELDBERG, THE PHILADELPHIA RIOTS OF 1844: A STUDY OF ETHNIC
CONFLICT 173 (1975); JORGENSON, supra note 45, at 70.
104. JORGENSON, supra note 45, at 70.
105. See id.
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Nothings were particularly strong in the Northern and border states,
and sent about seventy-five Congressmen to Washington in 1854.106
That same year, they carried Massachusetts, Delaware, and, in
combination with the remaining Whigs, Pennsylvania107 The
following year, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Connecticut,
Maryland, and Kentucky went for the Know Nothings, with
Tennessee remaining Democratic by a narrow margin.108 Many
statewide officeholders in New York, Pennsylvania, and California
belonged to the Know Nothing party, which also made tremendous
inroads in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Virginia without
capturing those states.109
According to Professor Anbinder, the two most important
tenets of the Know Nothing movement were that “Protestantism
defined American society” and that “Catholicism was not compatible
with the basic values that Americans cherished most.”110 A primary
factor in the enormous growth of the Know Nothing movement in
the early 1850s was the reemergence of controversies involving the
public schools, which set off a new round of nativism and antiCatholicism.111 Anbinder notes that:
The First Plenary Council of American Catholic Bishops,
which met in Baltimore in 1852, called American public
schools irreligious and decreed that Catholics should
instead educate their children in parochial schools. This
led Catholic leaders to renew their demand, first made in
the 1840’s, that the states finance Catholic schools.112
Bible reading in the public schools added fuel to the public school
controversy, as epitomized by the Donahoe case in Maine where
Catholics objected to reading the Protestant King James Bible.113
Once in office, the Know Nothings devoted a significant
proportion of their legislative agenda to educational matters,
believing that the “surest method of guaranteeing the supremacy of
Protestant values lay in promoting Protestantism in the public

106. Id. at 71.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. TYLER ANBINDER, NATIVISM AND SLAVERY: THE NORTHERN KNOW NOTHINGS &
THE POLITICS OF THE 1850S, 104–05 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
111. Id. at 24.
112. Id. (footnote omitted).
113. Id. at 25.

568

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:2

schools.”114 In Massachusetts, for example, Know Nothing lawmakers
addressed both Bible reading and aid to Catholic schools.115 The
Know Nothings passed statutes requiring that students read from the
King James Bible daily, and forbidding by constitutional amendment
the use of state funds in sectarian schools (the proto-Blaine
amendment mentioned earlier).116 Together, these provisions, the
“Know Nothings hoped, would make parochial schools financially
infeasible, forcing the children of Catholics to learn ‘American’
customs in the public schools.”117
Although the Know Nothing political movement fractured over
the issue of slavery after 1855, most of its supporters were absorbed
into another new political party: the Republicans.118 The Civil War,
precipitated by the election of Abraham Lincoln, saw a substantial
reduction in nativism, as large numbers of immigrants served in the
Northern armies.119 The New York City draft riots, in which Irish
rioters viciously attacked the city’s black inhabitants, triggered a
renewal of anti-Irish sentiment, yet it was educational controversies
that stoked anti-Catholicism.120 In New York City, where “Boss”
Tweed introduced legislation to allow public financing of parochial
schools, he accomplished the same objective by “quietly amending”
the city’s tax laws.121 Protestants reacted with outrage when they
discovered what he had done and the ensuing controversy continued
until the 1870s.122 Similar funding disputes broke out in New Jersey
and Ohio in the mid-1870s.123
Simultaneously, the early 1870s saw continued Catholic protests
against Protestant Bible reading in the public schools, which lead to
the local school boards of Cincinnati, Chicago, and New York to vote
to prohibit Bible reading and religious exercises in their public
schools.124 Professor Viteritti asserts that: “[t]he political ascent of
the growing ‘Catholic menace’ in urban centers spurred Protestant
114. Id. at 135.
115. Id. at 136.
116. Id.
117. Id. (footnotes omitted).
118. Id. at 244–45.
119. Id. at 270–71.
120. Id. at 271.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaines’ Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State
Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 670 (1998).
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churches to join with newly formed nativist groups to launch a twopronged campaign to preserve Bible study in public-school curricula
and to deny government support to sectarian institutions.”125
B.

The Federal Blaine Amendment

In September of 1875, President Ulysses S. Grant vowed in a
speech to “[e]ncourage free [public] schools, and resolve that not
one dollar . . . be appropriated to the support of any sectarian
schools.”126 Grant then sent a message to Congress requesting a
proposal for a constitutional amendment to deny aid to religious
institutions.127 Grant was himself briefly a Know Nothing in the
1850s, before winning the presidency as a Republican.128 Two of his
vice presidents, former Speaker of the House of Representatives
Schuyler Colfax of Indiana and former Senator Henry Wilson of
Massachusetts, had been prominent Know Nothings.129
Grant was responding to growing political pressure from
Protestant churches and nativist groups with a two-pronged agenda:
“to preserve Bible study in public-school curricula and to deny
government aid support to sectarian institutions.”130 Former Speaker
of the House of Representatives James G. Blaine, who aspired to the
Republican presidential nomination to succeed Grant, proposed in
December 1875 a constitutional amendment that read:
No state shall make any law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no
money raised by taxation in any state for the support of
public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor,
nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under
the control of any religious sect; nor shall any money so
raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious
sects or denominations.131

125.
126.
127.
128.
(1997).
129.
130.
131.
138–39.

Id. at 670 (footnote omitted).
Green, supra note 22, at 47.
Viteritti, supra note 124, at 670.
See Tyler Anbinder, Ulysses S. Grant, Nativist, 43 CIV. WAR HIST. 119, 120
ANBINDER, supra note 110, at 274.
Viteritti, supra note 124, at 670.
4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875), as reprinted in JORGENSON, supra note 45, at
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This version passed the House with 180 votes in favor and seven
opposed, with slight modifications, and was sent to the Senate.132
There the Judiciary Committee of the Republican-controlled Senate
made two key changes. First, the Committee members added a
provision stating that the bill was never to be interpreted to bar the
Bible from the public schools; this preserved the Protestant-nativist
coalition’s objective of preserving bible study, which the house
version failed to address.133 Second, they expanded the proscription
on use of school funds for sectarian schools to the proscription on
use of any public funds.134 Although a strong majority of the Senate
voted for the Senate version—28 to 16—it failed to receive the
requisite two-thirds majority vote needed for a constitutional
amendment.135
Before turning to the after-life of the federal Blaine
Amendment, it is necessary to discuss why anyone thought it was
needed at all. Today we are used to virtually all of the Bill of Rights
applying to the states because of the United States Supreme Court’s
incorporation of them through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.136 But this was not the case in 1875–76 when
Congress considered the federal Blaine Amendment. Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court had recently rejected the most obvious
means of applying the Bill of Rights to the states when it decided in
the Slaughterhouse Cases that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment had very limited application to the
states.137 The Supreme Court did not apply the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment to the states until 1940 for the Free Exercise
Clause138 and 1947 for the Establishment Clause.139

132. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 298 n.28 (2002).
133. JORGENSON, supra note 45, at 139.
134. Id. at 139.
135. HAMBURGER, supra note 132, at 298 n.28.
136. Among the first rights to be applied to the states was the Free Speech
clause, which like the Religion Clauses is textually addressed to Congress alone. See
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
137. Kermit Roosevelt, III, What if Slaughter-House had Been Decided Differently?, 45
IND. L. REV. 61, 62 (2011) (“[T]he Court had adopted a reading of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause that excluded the Bill of Rights liberties from its scope.”).
138. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940).
139. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1947); see Russell A. Hilton, The
Case for the Selective Disincorporation of the Establishment Clause: Is Everson a
Super-Precedent?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1701, 1701–02 (2007); see also William P. Gray, The
Ten Commandments and the Ten Amendments: A Case Study of Religious Freedom in
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In fact, the debate over the Blaine Amendment contains no
inkling that anyone in Congress in 1876, let alone the body as a
whole, believed the recent ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment applied the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses to the
states.140 Consequently, the House version of the federal Blaine
Amendment’s first two clauses repeated the language of the federal
Religion Clauses while substituting “the states” for “Congress.”141
This version also added specific language providing that no public
school funds be provided to or under the control of any religious
sect or denomination.142 There is no indication that either house of
Congress viewed the specific language of its Blaine Amendment as
inconsistent with either the Free Exercise or Establishment
Clauses.143
Indeed, until the United States Supreme Court conclusively
resolved the matter in 2002, advocates for an expansive reading of
state Blaine Amendments as prohibiting educational choice
programs that permit parental choice of religious schools always
argued that such programs also violated the Establishment Clause.
In 2000, the Supreme Court reiterated in Mitchell v. Helms its
longstanding view that the Establishment Clause prohibited
unrestricted aid to religious institutions qua institutions.144 Two years
later, however, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court held that
religiously-neutral programs driven by the genuine and independent
choices of parents do not violate the Establishment Clause.145 It is
this development that has left opponents of educational choice
programs relying only on the state Blaine Amendments.
Thus, from their founding until the United States Supreme
Court’s Cantwell and Everson decisions in 1940 and 1947, respectively,
states were not subject to the federal Religion Clauses.146 This was, of
Alabama, 49 ALA. L. REV. 509, 530 (1998).
140. See Viteritti, supra note 124, at 671.
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. See Gray, supra note 139, at 426 (“Furthermore, since the Blaine
Amendment was debated only seven years after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, its mere introduction casts considerable doubt on the proposition that
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to incorporate the Establishment
Clause.”).
144. 530 U.S. 793, 842–44 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring). As the narrower
opinion making up the majority, Justice O’Connor’s decision is controlling.
145. 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
146. See Russell A. Hilton, The Case for the Selective Disincorporation of the
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course, deliberate, as the direction of the federal Religion Clauses to
Congress served both to prevent the establishment of a national
religion, and to leave alone any state establishments.147 This reflected
the fact that the New England colonies, and then states, had
established Congregationalism for special support, while the
southern colonies (and later states) had established Anglicanism.148
The Establishment Clause thus prevented either Congregationalism
or Anglicanism from being established as a national religion.149
Pennsylvania, and several other states located between the
South and New England, had no established religion. Founded by
Quakers who were persecuted by the other Protestant
denominations,150 Pennsylvania had secured in its “Laws Agreed
Upon in England” in 1682 a “compelled support clause” prohibiting
any religious establishment. This clause constituted article XXXV:
That all Persons living in this Province, who confess and
acknowledge the One Almighty and Eternal God, to be the
Creator, Upholder and Ruler of the World and that hold
themselves obliged in Conscience to live peaceably and
justly in Civil Society, shall, in no wayes be molested or
prejudiced in their Religious Perswasion or Practice in
matters of Faith and Worship, nor shall they be compelled,
at any time, to frequent or maintain any Religious Worship,
Place, or Ministry whatever.151
As the early states disestablished their state religions they often
included compelled support clauses in their constitutions.152
Establishment Clause: Is Everson a Super-Precedent?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1701, 1701–02 (2007).
147. See id. (“On the one hand, Congress could not establish religion or prohibit
free exercise. On the other hand, the states were free to regulate religion according
to their own constitutions.”).
148. HAMBURGER, supra note 132, at 84.
149. See Gray, supra note 139, at 518 (citing Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of
the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1700, 1703 (1992)).
150. EDWARD D. BALTZELL, PURITAN BOSTON AND QUAKER PHILADELPHIA 86
(1996) (“The mayor of the city ordered [a Quaker women] and her companion be
stripped to the waist and whipped at the market cross till the blood ran down their
bodies.” (internal quotations omitted)); CHARLES B. KINNEY, CHURCH AND STATE:
THE STRUGGLE FOR SEPARATION IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 15 (1955) (“To sum up the law,
the whole order was an effort to eliminate Quakers . . . and other persons who would
in any conceivable way give aid and comfort to these people and their ‘blasphemous’
ideas.”).
151. 2 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 30
(Neil Cogan ed., 2015).
152. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“No man shall be compelled to frequent or
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Alternatively, some states disestablished their religion by modifying
the federal Religion Clauses to apply to their state.153 Today, twentynine states have “compelled support clauses” in their state
constitutions, including ten states that do not have Blaine
Amendments,154 and nineteen that do.155 With the exception of
Vermont,156 the states with only compelled support clauses have not
interpreted their clauses to prohibit educational choice programs.157
The failure of the federal Blaine Amendment did not end
efforts to deny funds to sectarian schools. As Professor Viteritti notes,
“by 1876 fourteen states had enacted legislation prohibiting the use
of public funds for religious schools,”158 with at least Michigan,
Wisconsin, Indiana, and Massachusetts doing so by constitutional
provision before the 1870s.159 They were joined in the 1870s by
Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, and Texas.160 Colorado adopted a Blaine Amendment

support any religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever.”). Largely on the basis
of Thomas Jefferson’s Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, which he wrote in
1777, introduced in 1779, and which was enacted in 1786, Virginia gets undeserved
credit for its contributions to religious liberty. See Cogan, supra note 151, at 51–52
(providing the text of Jefferson’s statute). That statute’s operative language was later
incorporated into Article 1, section 16 of the Virginia Constitution. See id.
Pennsylvania’s 1776 Constitution already contained the following language by the
time Jefferson drafted his bill:
That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences and
understanding; And that no man ought to or of right can be compelled
to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship,
or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own free will and
consent.
Id. at 31.
153. See, e.g., ME. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
154. Arkansas, Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia.
155. Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois; Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana; Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia.
156. See Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Vermont, 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999)
(holding that its constitution’s compelled support clause prohibited parents from
choosing religious schools in Vermont’s educational choice program).
157. See KOMER & NEILY, supra note 8 (providing the text of these provisions).
158. VITERITTI, supra note 124, at 673.
159. VITERITTI, supra note 84, at 153–54.
160. Id.
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in its first Constitution in 1876,161 as did New Hampshire in 1877.162
By 1890, twenty-nine state constitutions had such provisions.163 Eight
more states added similar provisions after that, including all six states
entering the Union after 1890: Utah (1896), Oklahoma (1906), New
Mexico (1912), Arizona (1912), Alaska (1959), and Hawaii (1959).164
With the exception of Alaska and Hawaii, all states with Blaine
Amendments added them prior to the United States Supreme Court
decision holding that the federal Religion Clauses applied to the
states in 1940 (Free Exercise Clause)165 and 1947 (Establishment
Clause).166
C.

Interpretation of State Blaine Amendments: The Good, the Bad, and
the Unknown

Despite the incorporation of Blaine Amendments into the
constitutions of thirty-seven states,167 parents who use or desire to use
religious schools to educate their children have never given up trying
to obtain financial aid from state sources to reduce the financial
burden of both paying to support public schools they do not want to
use and paying the costs of buying a private education.168 Although
Pierce dashed public school advocates’ hopes that they could force all
students into public schools, Pierce did nothing to ameliorate the
financial sacrifice involved in obtaining a private school
education.169 Public school advocates welcomed the application of
the Establishment Clause to the states in Everson because it added a
161. DALE A. OESTERLE & RICHARD B. COLLINS, THE COLORADO STATE
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 211 (2002).
162. See MARSHALL, supra note 92, at 17.
163. Green, supra note 22, at 43.
164. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12; HAW. CONST. art. X,
§ 1; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 3; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4, art.
X, § 9.
165. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
166. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
167. The count would be 38 except that Louisiana repealed its Blaine
Amendment when adopting a new constitution in 1973. See KOMER & NEILY, supra
note 8, at 38.
168. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
In his dissent, Justice Jackson alluded to this double financial burden, stating “I have
a sympathy, though it is not ideological, with Catholic citizens who are compelled
by law to pay taxes for public schools, and also feel constrained by conscience to
support other schools for their own children.” Id.
169. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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second string to their bow in the quest to prevent state aid for private
school families.170 But, Everson also suggested that the Free Exercise
Clause might be a concern by excluding families using religious
schools from religiously-neutral public benefit programs.171 Indeed,
Trinity Lutheran is but the latest manifestation of this concern.172
Justice Black, in his opinion for the Court in Everson, spoke to
the interaction between the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause:
We must consider the New Jersey statute in accordance
with the foregoing limitations imposed by the First
Amendment. . . . New Jersey cannot consistently with the
“establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment
contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution
which teaches the tenets and faith of any church. On the
other hand, other language in the amendment commands
that New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free
exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot
exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans,
Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or
the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or
lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation.173
The New Jersey statute in Everson provided for reimbursement
to private school parents for the costs of transporting their children
to public or private schools, although in Ewing Township all the
private school students happened to be attending Catholic
schools.174 The plaintiffs objected to this as aid to sectarian
schools.175 In his penultimate paragraph, Justice Black referenced
Pierce and noted that the statute contributed no money to the schools
the children attended:
This Court has said that parents may, in the discharge of
their duty under state compulsory education laws, send
their children to a religious rather than a public school if
the school meets the secular education requirements
which the state has power to impose. It appears that these
170. See Viteritti, supra note 124.
171. See id. at 705–06; see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 1.
172. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,
2039–40 (2017).
173. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
174. Id. at 20.
175. Id. at 32–33.
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parochial schools meet New Jersey’s requirements. The
State contributes no money to the schools. It does not
support them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more than
provide a general program to help parents get their
children, regardless of their religion, safely and
expeditiously to and from accredited schools.176
The distinction drawn by advocates for educational choice
programs between aid to schools as institutions (prohibited by both
the Establishment Clause and state Blaine Amendments) and aid to
families that empower them to select private schools, including
religious ones, derives directly from this paragraph of Everson, and
Justice Black’s conclusion that the aid to parents “contributes no
money to schools” and “does not support them.”177
Moreover, application of the Religion Clauses to the states also
led to the removal of religion from the public schools, as required
by the United States Supreme Court post-Everson.178 This further
changed the dynamic by leading to the creation or expansion of
Protestant private schools, once compulsory prayer and Bible
reading were outlawed by the Supreme Court.179 The secularization
of the public schools was viewed by many Protestant and Catholic
parents alike as actively hostile to religion, rather than neutral.180
176. Id. at 18 (citations omitted); see Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
177. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
178. See Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (prohibiting
school-organized student-led prayer at high school football games); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992) (banning the inclusion of invocations and benedictions in the
form of prayer at graduation ceremonies); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)
(prohibiting one minute for prayer or meditation); Sch. Dist. Abington Twp. Pa. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (outlawing compulsory Bible reading in public
schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (outlawing school-sponsored
voluntary prayer in public schools). Santa Fe arose out of New Mexico, Lee out of
Rhode Island, Wallace out of Alabama, Schempp out of Pennsylvania, and Engel out of
New York. Four of these five states (all except Rhode Island) have Blaine
Amendments in their state constitutions, indicating that Blaine Amendments
continued to be viewed as compatible with Protestant religious elements in the
public schools well into the 20th century. See KOMER & NEILY, supra note 8.
179. Newsom, supra note 37, at 277 (“It did not help that the Roman Catholic
Church, having grown tired of the imposition of common school religion on its
children, decided to establish its own separate parochial school system.”).
180. See Brad J. Davidson, Balancing Parental Choice, State Interest, and the
Establishment Clause: Constitutional Guidelines for States, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 435, 454
(2002) (“The cases dealing with topics such as religious expression in public schools,
stopping the recitation or required prayers in public schools, or the elimination of
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Indeed, the difficulties that public schools have in teaching moral
values, and the incompatibility of the values they do teach with many
parents’ belief systems, have led even parents who are not
particularly religious to look to religious schools of various
denominations for their children’s education.181
The efforts of Catholics, now reinforced by significant numbers
of Protestants, shifted after the passage of the state Blaine
Amendments from efforts to obtain a share of the public school
funds to other means of aiding private school families.182
Accordingly, programs like the transportation subsidies at issue in
Everson were sought in several states, including New Jersey, as were
other sorts of assistance such as the provision of free secular
textbooks.183 These efforts spawned a substantial number of cases in
the state courts that were challenged under the state Blaine
Amendments. When state supreme courts held that their respective
Blaine Amendments prohibited the aid, advocates for educational
aid to private school students sought to use the Free Exercise Clause
and other federal constitutional provisions to get the United States
Supreme Court to overrule the application of the state Blaine
Amendments.184
Turning to the state interpretations first, it is possible to
categorize the interpretations of the thirty-seven states with Blaine
Amendments into three broad categories. The first category consists
of states that broadly interpret their Blaine Amendments to reach
beyond aid to religious schools as institutions and additionally
encompass aid to families choosing such schools. These are states
with “bad” Blaine law, from the perspective of persons and
organizations advocating for more educational choice.185 This
Bible reading in public schools, are viewed by some as hostile rather than neutral
toward religion.”).
181. See id. at 437.
182. See Jonathan D. Boyer, Education Tax Credits: School Choice Initiatives Capable
of Surmounting Blaine Amendments, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 117, 122 (2009).
183. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); see Jason S. Marks, Only A
“Speed Bump” Separating Church and State?, 57 J. MO. B. 36, 40 (2001) (“[T]he
separationist position first advanced in Everson, retreating only so far as to allow
loans of secular textbooks to nonpublic school students and to give state income tax
deductions of educational expenses incurred by parents whose children attend a
nonpublic school.”).
184. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
185. See Clint Bolick, The Constitutional Parameters of School Choice, 2008 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 335, 343 (2008) (“Blaine Amendments—particularly broadly written
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category is comprised of fourteen states: Alaska, California,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, South Dakota, Virginia, and
Washington.186
The second category consists of those states that have given their
Blaine Amendments a narrower construction, one that appears to
permit aid to private school families. Advocates for educational
choice regard these states as having “good” Blaine law.187 This
category is comprised of seventeen states: Alabama, Arizona,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, and Wisconsin. The third and final category consists
of those states whose general dearth of interpretation regarding the
Blaine Amendments leaves one unable to put the state in either of
the first two categories because of the lack of a definitive
interpretation. This last category is comprised of six states: Colorado,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming.
Having “bad Blaine law” means that such states cannot enact
educational choice programs funded using state or local funds, often
referred to as scholarship or voucher programs.188 Meanwhile, no
versions—pose a stark threat to private school choice programs.”).
186. Of note is Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Vermont. 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999).
Because the opinion involved Vermont’s compelled support provision, Vermont
would likely be affected in the same way as the fourteen states that broadly interpret
their Blaine Amendments. In addition, Maine, which has neither a Blaine nor
compelled support clause, would also be affected, as overruling the decision in
Chittenden would suggest that Eulitt v. Maine Department of Education was incorrectly
decided. 386 F.3d 344 (1st Cir. 2004). Eulitt permitted the exclusion of all religious
schools from an educational choice program that allows families to choose secular
private schools. Id.
187. See Boyer, supra note 182, at 139 (“School-choice advocates have attempted
to surmount Blaine Amendments by . . . urging all states to narrowly construe their
Blaine Amendments.”).
188. Opponents of educational choice prefer to call these programs “voucher
programs” because much of the American public does not understand what a
voucher is, although many of the federal programs they are familiar with are
voucher programs. Advocates prefer to use “scholarship programs” because most
people understand what a scholarship program is and that it is based on choices
made by the scholarship recipients. See, e.g., Jacob Blizzard, Where Have All the Taxes
Gone: Creating and Administering a Working Education System for Texas Through Universal
Vouchers, 13 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 209, 211 (2012) (providing a brief overview of
voucher systems and explaining Texas’ new plan for financing and funding
education through its voucher system). See generally Martha McCarthy, Ph.D. The
Legal Status of School Vouchers: The Saga Continues, 297 ED. L. REP. 655, 657–58 (2013)
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such impediment exists for states with good Blaine law or those with
no Blaine Amendment at all. Nonetheless—with the exception of
Michigan and possibly Massachusetts—states with bad Blaine law can
create scholarship programs funded by private donations incentivized
by state tax credits.189 Florida, South Dakota, and Virginia have bad
Blaine law but also have tax credit-based scholarship programs.
Notably, Florida’s corporate tax credit program is the largest
educational choice program in the country, serving over 100,000
students.190 Michigan is unique in that it is the only state that has
amended its Blaine to make it much more restrictive than it was
previously. Michigan amended its constitution in 1972 in response
to a 1970 advisory opinion of its supreme court that the previous
version would allow some aid to religious schools.191 Though less
clear, an advisory opinion of Massachusetts’ highest court also
appears to preclude using tax benefits to incentivize educational
choice programs.192 This author categorizes these states’ Blaine laws
on the basis of previous appellate rulings of the state courts.
Over the years, various forms of educational assistance have
been tried by state legislatures, with some courts allowing the
programs to go forward and others halting them. Consider the issue
of providing transportation to students of religious schools. In 1934,

(offering comparative background on scholarship and educational voucher
programs).
189. See Manzara v. State, 343 S.W.3d 656 (Mo. 2011); Tax Equity All. for Mass.,
Inc. v. Comm’r, 516 N.E.2d 152 (Mass. 1987); State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
162 Cal. App. 4th 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Olson v. State, 742 N.W.2d 681 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2007).
190. See School Choice in America Dashboard, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.or
g/school-choice/school-choice-in-america/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2017) (collecting
and describing all school choice programs).
191. See Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of P.A. 1970, No. 100, 180 N.W.2d
265 (Mich. 1970). Article VIII, section 2 of Michigan’s Constitution now reads:
No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or any
public credit utilized, by the legislature or any other political subdivision
or agency of the state directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any private,
denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary, elementary, or
secondary school. No payment, credit, tax benefit, exemption or
deductions, tuition voucher, subsidy, grant or loan of public monies or
property shall be provided, directly or indirectly, to support the
attendance of any student or the employment of any person at any such
nonpublic school or at any location or institution where instruction is
offered in whole or in part to such nonpublic school students.
192. Op. of Justices to Senate, 514 N.E.2d 353, 258 (Mass. 1987).
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the Delaware Supreme Court held in State ex rel. Traub v. Brown that
Delaware’s program providing transportation to religious school
students violated its Blaine Amendment, because the program
“would help build up, strengthen and make successful” religious
schools.193 New York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, followed
suit in 1938 in Judd v. Board of Education.194 These cases were decided
exclusively on state constitutional grounds. Both Delaware and New
York amended their constitutions in response to Brown and Judd,
respectively, to permit transportation of all private school
students.195
In Everson v. Board of Education, another transportation case
arising out of New Jersey, the Supreme Court for the first applied the
Establishment Clause to the states.196 The Court in Everson held that
the New Jersey statute did not violate the Establishment Clause.197
Post-Everson, the same states that struck down program
pre-Everson—Delaware and New York—reached conflicting
conclusions on subsequent cases, which explains why this author
classifies Delaware as interpreting its Blaine broadly to preclude
educational choice programs and New York as interpreting its Blaine
narrowly as permitting educational choice. In an advisory opinion
issued in 1966, well after Everson, the Delaware Supreme Court
justices opined that a bill for transporting private school students at
public expense would violate its Blaine Amendment by providing
“incidental” aid to religious schools.198 Several other state supreme
courts faced the same question after Everson and reached conflicting
results.199
In Board of Education v. Allen,200 the New York Court of Appeals
addressed a different sort of aid to religious school students: the
provision of free secular textbooks. The court went precisely the
opposite way as the Delaware court, overruling Judd and declaring
that its Blaine, which prohibits both direct and indirect aid to

193. 172 A. 835, 837 (Del. 1934).
194. 15 N.E.2d 576 (N.Y. 1938).
195. See DEL. CONST. art. X, § 5; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
196. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3 (1947).
197. Id. at 18.
198. Op. of the Justices, 216 A.2d 668, 671 (Del. 1966).
199. Compare Epeldi v. Engelking, 488 P.2d 860 (Idaho 1971) (prohibiting
transportation), with Americans United v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 179 N.W.2d 146 (Minn.
1970) (permitting transportation).
200. 228 N.E.2d 791 (N.Y. 1967).
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religious schools,201 does not prohibit forms of student assistance
that incidentally aid religious schools. After the court of appeals
upheld the textbook program, the plaintiffs appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, alleging that the program violated the
Establishment Clause. The resulting 1968 Supreme Court decision,
also named Board of Education v. Allen,202 upheld the program as well,
leading a number of other state legislatures to enact textbook aid
programs, thereby generating more state court litigation involving
state Blaine Amendments.
Some states reached a similar result to New York, upholding
textbook programs from attacks based on Blaine Amendments.203
But other states read their Blaine Amendments more broadly than
the federal Establishment Clause. For example, California—despite
upholding in 1946 under its Blaine Amendment a program that
allowed for transporting religious school students204—held in 1981
that its textbook program violated its Blaine Amendment.205 Other
state supreme courts did so as well.206
Of particular interest for this article, because Trinity Lutheran
involved Missouri’s Blaine Amendments, is that Missouri interprets
its Blaine Amendments broadly, at least with respect to elementary
and secondary education programs. In Paster v. Tussey, in 1974, seven
years after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Board of
Education v. Allen, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that providing
textbooks to pupils in religious schools violated one of its Blaine

201. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3. Five other states’ Blaine Amendments use similar
“direct or indirect” language: FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 7;
MO. CONST. art. I, § 7; MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6; and OKLA CONST. art. II, § 5.
202. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
203. See, e.g., Chance v. Miss. Textbook Rating & Purchasing Bd., 200 So. 706,
712–13 (Miss. 1941) (stating that the state had a duty to its public-school students
“to have available to their use uniform textbooks”).
204. See Bowker v. Baker, 167 P.2d 256, 263 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946).
205. See Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. Riley, 632 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1981) (holding that a
statute authorizing the Superintendent of Public Schools to provide public school
textbooks to students attending non-public and sectarian schools violated the
California Constitution).
206. See, e.g., Bloom v. Sch. Comm., 379 N.E.2d 578 (Mass. 1978); Gaffney v.
State Dep’t of Educ., 220 N.W.2d 550 (Neb. 1974), superseded by constitutional
amendment, NEB. CONS. art. VII, § 11.
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Amendments.207 Just two years later in Americans United v. Rogers,208
the Missouri Supreme Court, in a dispute regarding state-provided
higher education grants, held that the program did not violate the
same Blaine Amendment because the public purpose of promoting
higher education overrode any incidental benefit to private religious
colleges.209 Rogers is difficult to reconcile with Paster. But, until the
1970s, the United States Supreme Court also applied a looser
Establishment Clause standard to higher education aid than to
elementary and secondary education aid.210
Missouri’s contrasting decisions involving higher and lower
education epitomize why Blaine Amendments are significant to
educational choice programs.211 Such programs empower families
and students to choose private schools if they so desire. However,
with a substantial majority of those schools being religious,
opportunities for educational choice are severely limited if courts
truncate textbook programs by excluding students attending
religious schools.212 The United States Supreme Court no longer
207. 512 S.W.2d 97, 104 (Mo. 1974) (holding that “[r]equiring public school
boards to provide textbooks to pupils attending private schools” violates the
Missouri Constitution).
208. 538 S.W.2d 711, 718 (Mo. 1976) (“Will implementation of the statutory
program tend to entangle the state excessively in church affairs? We think the
answer is ‘No.’”).
209. See id.
210. See Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976) (stating that a
state can subsidize secular projects at religious colleges); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734, 748 (1973) (holding that a state agency can assist religious colleges with
revenue bonds for construction); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 683 (1971)
(stating that religious colleges can receive construction aid). The United States
Supreme Court sought to justify this distinction in its treatment of higher and lower
education on the basis that religious colleges were not “pervasively sectarian” the
way religious elementary and secondary schools were. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 685–86. In
2000, the Court abandoned this rationale and permitted institutional aid to
religious elementary and secondary schools restricted to secular activities, the same
rule it applies to religious higher education institutions. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793 (2000) (allowing federal funds to be distributed to private schools through
state and local agencies).
211. See, e.g., Mallory Nygard, National School Choice Week: Blaine Amendments Still
a Threat to Catholic Education, CARDINAL NEWMAN SOC’Y (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://cardinalnewmansociety.org/national-school-choice-week-blaine-amendme
ndments-still-threat-catholic-education/ (“[O]pponents of school choice programs
[are] claiming it is illegal for public funds to ever be received by religiously-affiliated
schools even if given indirectly through parents.”).
212. See Facts and Studies, COUNCIL FOR AM. PRIVATE EDUC. (2017),
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broadly interprets the Establishment Clause to equate aid
empowering the choice to attend religious schools with the aid
provided to religious schools themselves as institutional assistance.213
With the evolution of Federal Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
the Federal Constitution no longer supplies an impediment to
properly-constructed educational choice programs.214
States with broad Blaine law interpretations (i.e., “bad” Blaine
law) either decline to implement programs enhancing parents’
ability to use private schools or, if implemented, state courts strike
down such programs under the state constitution.215 Accordingly,
states with a narrow interpretation of Blaine law—”good” Blaine law
states—or those with no Blaine Amendment at all, have played a
disproportionate role in the development of the United States
Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. For example,
the United States Supreme Court decided Everson v. Board of
Education on appeal from a New Jersey Supreme Court decision
upholding the program. New Jersey has no Blaine Amendment.
Similarly, the Court decided Board of Education v. Allen on an appeal
from a decision of New York’s highest court, in which that court
reversed its interpretation of its Blaine Amendment from bad to
good.
In particular, the key United States Supreme Court decisions
leading to Zelman (itself from Ohio, a state having no Blaine
Amendment) besides Everson and Allen, have, with one exception,
come from states with good Blaine law: Minnesota in Mueller v.
Allen,216 Arizona in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,217 and
http://www.capenet.org/facts.html (stating that in 2014, 93% of K–12 private
school students attended religious schools).
213. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 650 (2002) (citing cases on either
side of this distinction).
214. See id. at 640 (“[A] program is not readily subject to challenge under the
Establishment Clause” if the program comports with two characteristics: the
program must be religiously neutral, and must “provide[] assistance directly to a
broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools
wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice.”).
215. See Dick Komer, No Longer a Matter of Interpretation, INST. FOR JUSTICE (Dec.
2002), http://ij.org/ll/december-2002-volume-11-number-6/targeting-state-constit
utions-to-advance-choice/.
216. 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983) (upholding Minnesota state tax deductions for
educational expenses, the vast majority of which were used for private religious
school tuition).
217. 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1997) (upholding use of Arizona state funds to provide an
interpreter to a deaf student in a religious school).
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New York again in Agostini v. Felton.218 The exception is Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind,219 where for reasons not
apparently obvious the Washington Supreme Court decided the
Federal Establishment Clause question without addressing the state’s
Blaine Amendments.220 On remand, after the United States
Supreme Court reversed the Establishment Clause holding, the
Washington court held the program inconsistent with one of its
Blaine Amendments, a decision the United States Supreme Court
declined to review.221 Taken together, these United States Supreme
Court decisions led to the Court’s recognition in Zelman of the
difference between aid flowing to institutions as institutional
assistance and aid flowing to parents and students as student
assistance.222
Because of the dual coverage supplied by both the federal and
state religion clauses, generally “good” Blaine laws are those that
maintain a parallel interpretation between the state and federal
interpretations. States with “bad” Blaine law are those that take a
position that their state constitution clauses require a more rigid
separation of church and state. Because this more rigid separation
can infringe on federal rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, advocates for greater educational choice are intensely
interested in cases from states with bad Blaine law like Trinity
Lutheran.223 Before turning to those United States Supreme Court
cases, however, a bit more information is needed about the evolution
of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence on
aiding religious schools and the families choosing them. It took the
Supreme Court a long time to develop the distinction it now

218. 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997) (upholding a New York provision of remedial
education services on site at religious schools).
219. 474 U.S. 481, 489–90 (1986) (upholding tuition for a blind student to
attend a religious college in pursuit of a religious vocation).
220. See id.
221. Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1123–24
(Wash. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989).
222. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653–54 (2002) (“[W]here a
government aid program . . . provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens
who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their
own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to
challenge under the Establishment Clause.”).
223. See, e.g., Erica Smith, Blaine Amendments and the Unconstitutionality of
Excluding Religious Options from School Choice Programs. 18 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 90
(2017).
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recognizes between institutional aid and student assistance
programs.224
D.

Institutional Aid Versus Student Assistance Under the Establishment
Clause

In the fifty-five years between Everson in 1947 and Zelman in
2002, the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence was
anything but clear.225 The implication of Everson that the Free
Exercise Clause constrained the proper interpretation of the
Establishment Clause was largely buried in a stream of cases that
resulted from state efforts to provide private school families some
financial relief.226 The Court failed to consistently recognize and
apply a distinction between tuition aid provided to students and
education-based aid provided to religious schools.227 This was in part
a failure to recognize that while public schools as state institutions
receive virtually all of their funding from government sources,228
private schools function in a marketplace in which families pay for
their children’s education. This failure allowed the Court to
overlook the distinction between aid to private schools themselves
and aid to families that might want to buy educational services from
such schools.
Consider, for example, the transportation and textbook
subsidies involved in Everson and Allen. In public schools, free bus
transportation and free textbooks are the norm. But these are
expenses typically paid by private school families, separate from
tuition. As with school uniforms, these services often can be obtained
from private vendors rather than the schools themselves. Subsidizing
these services thus subsidizes the families using them. While these
subsidies make it easier for families to use private schools, they are

224. Id. at 90–91 (explaining that Blaine Amendments were passed in the late
1800s and now the Supreme Court finally has an opportunity to resolve the issue).
225. Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the Establishment Clause: The Perspective of
Constitutional Litigation, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1317, 1318 (1997) (arguing that the main
criticism is that the Supreme Court has never articulated an underlying theory
toward the Establishment Clause).
226. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Comm. for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
227. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 24 (1947).
228. See, e.g., STEPHEN Q. CORNMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., REVENUES AND
EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS: SCHOOL
YEAR 2011–12, 5 (2015).
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different than subsidies provided to the schools themselves. This
assistance to families can be contrasted with aid provided to private
schools as institutions. Examples of such institutional aid to private
schools are not hard to find—the land and cash grants provided by
state legislatures to private schools and colleges like Harvard, Yale,
and Dartmouth, and secondary schools (when all of them were
religious institutions) are obvious examples.229 Similarly,
construction grants to build secular buildings at religious colleges,
approved by the United States Supreme Court in Tilton v. Richardson
(1971),230 and cash subsidies for private, including religious,
colleges, approved in Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland
(1976),231 are more modern examples.
In its early Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court often assumed that aid to private school students or their
families should be treated as aid to the schools themselves.232 This,
of course, is precisely what opponents of educational assistance
programs continue to argue.233 Ultimately the incoherence in the
Supreme Court’s case law led to the absurd situation where it
appeared that states could supply free secular textbooks (approved
in Everson) but not free maps (disapproved in Meek v. Pittenger).234
This left unanswered the question of whether an atlas—a book of
maps—could be provided without violating the Establishment
Clause.
The Court’s failure to distinguish between aid to students and
aid to schools is epitomized by the 1973 decision in Committee for
Public Education v. Nyquist,235 in which the Court struck down three
New York programs. The first provided maintenance grants directly
to private schools, an obvious form of institutional assistance.236 The
229. See GABEL, supra note 31, at 70–86.
230. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
231. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
232. Steven K. Green, Private School Vouchers and the Confusion over “Direct” Aid, 10
GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 47, 74 (2000) (“[T]he Court has consistently applied
the term [direct] to . . . mean: impermissible direct aid is aid that results in a
‘substantial advancement of the sectarian enterprise,’ regardless of the form it
takes.”).
233. Id. at 54 (“Tuition vouchers, being neither discrete nor restricted in their
application, can and will be used to pay for the entire educational process, of which
religion is an indispensable and inseparable part.”).
234. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
235. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
236. Id. at 756.
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other two provided modest grants to families using private schools
or modest tax benefits, depending on income.237 The Court treated
them all the same, characterizing them as yet another of the
“ingenious plans for channeling state aid to sectarian schools that
periodically reach th[is] Court.”238 The Court concluded that “if the
grants are offered as an incentive to parents to send their children
to sectarian schools by making unrestricted cash payments to them,
the Establishment Clause is violated whether or not the actual dollars
given eventually find their way into the sectarian institutions.”239 The
Court thus treated all three programs as having the effect of
supporting sectarian schools.240
Gradually, however, the Court began to recognize that aid to
families should not automatically be equated with aid to schools.
Thus, in its 1983 Mueller v. Allen decision, the Court upheld
Minnesota’s education-expenses tax deduction, even though the
plaintiffs alleged that more than 96% of the deductions were used
by parents for religious school tuition.241 The Court’s response was
unambiguous: “We need not consider these contentions in detail.
We would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of
a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to which
various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law.”242
In 1986 in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, the
Court unanimously concluded that Washington could provide
tuition aid to students pursuing a religious vocation at a religious
college.243 Five justices criticized the opinion of the Court for
237. Id. at 756–57.
238. Id. at 785.
239. Id. at 786. Fortunately for the future of educational choice programs,
in footnote 38 of its decision the Court refused to decide “whether the significantly
religious character of the statute’s beneficiaries might differentiate the present
cases from a case involving some form of public assistance (e.g., scholarships)
made available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or
public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited.” Id. at 782 n.38. The Court
then specifically mentioned the G.I. Bill (38 U.S.C. § 1651) as a possible example of
such a form of public assistance. Id. (citing 38 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970)). As a result,
until Zelman ended the need to distinguish Nyquist, educational choice litigation
involved an effort to fit the choice program into the confines of footnote 38. See,
e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 881 (2000); Kotterman v. Killian, 193 Ariz. 273,
279 (1999); Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 855 (1998).
240. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 794.
241. 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983).
242. Id.
243. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
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focusing on how few students used the program for a religious
education.244 Justice Powell in his concurring opinion specifically
relied on Mueller as making clear that “state programs that are wholly
neutral in offering educational assistance to a class defined without
reference to religion do not violate [the Lemon test by having a
primary effect of advancing religion] because any aid to religion
results from the private choices of individual beneficiaries.”245
Finally, in 2000 and 2002, the Court decided a pair of cases that
crystallized the difference in treatment between institutional aid
cases and educational choice cases. In Mitchell v. Helms, the Court
upheld the state’s providing of institutional aid to religious schools
if the aid was restricted to non-religious uses.246 The instructional
materials funded by the federal government and supplied by public
school districts to private schools were indistinguishable from the
instructional materials involved in Meek.247 Thus, the Mitchell Court
overruled Meek and upheld the program.248 In doing so, it jettisoned
the “pervasively sectarian” doctrine that asserted religious
elementary and secondary schools had to be excluded from some
assistance programs.249
Mitchell involved a program where private schools received aid
based upon their proportion of enrolled students.250 The plurality
opinion of Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, concluded that “[a]ny aid . . . that
ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the
genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients . . .
means that the decision to support religious education is made by
the individual, not by the State.”251 In response to Justice Souter’s
dissent emphasizing the “pervasively sectarian” nature of the
Catholic schools participating in the program, the plurality linked
that concept to the failed federal Blaine Amendment:

244. Id. at 490 (White, J., concurring); id. at 490–93 (Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.,
Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 493 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
245. Id. at 490–91 (footnote omitted).
246. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
247. Id. at 797 (“To the extent that Meek and Wolman conflict with the foregoing
analysis, they are overruled.”).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 829.
250. Id. at 798.
251. 530 U.S. at 811–12 (citing Witters, 474 U.S. at 487–88).
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[H]ostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a
shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow. . . .
Although the dissent professes concern for “the implied
exclusion of the less favored,” . . . the exclusion of
pervasively sectarian schools from government-aid
programs is just that, particularly given the history of such
exclusion. Opposition to aid to “sectarian” schools
obtained prominence in the 1870’s with Congress’
consideration (and near passage) of the Blaine
Amendment, which would have amended the Constitution
to bar any aid to sectarian institutions. Consideration of the
amendment arose at a time of pervasive hostility to the
Catholic Church and Catholics in general, and it was an
open secret that “sectarian” was code for “Catholic.”252
Noting that the Court’s subsequent coining of the term
“pervasively sectarian” applied primarily to Catholic elementary and
secondary schools, the plurality concluded by saying: “In short[,]
nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the exclusion of
pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise permissible aid
programs, and other doctrines of this Court bar it. This doctrine,
born of bigotry, should be buried now.”253
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, filed a concurring
opinion in which she emphasized what she regarded as the
plurality’s focus on the unitary criterion of religious neutrality.254 In
her view, for programs that provided institutional aid to schools,
religious neutrality in distributing the benefits was insufficient,
standing alone, to comply with the Establishment Clause—
restriction of the aid to secular aspects of education was also
required.255 Thus, it remained to be seen how a majority of the Court
would treat an actual educational choice program, in which the aid
was provided to defray parents’ costs of sending their children to
private schools, most of which would be religious.
In 2002, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Supreme Court
answered that question by approving Ohio’s scholarship program
for students attending Cleveland’s private schools.256 Justice
O’Connor joined the four justices from the Mitchell plurality in

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 828 (citations omitted).
Id. at 829.
Id. at 836–67 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 839–40 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002).
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upholding the program under the Establishment Clause.257 The
five-justice majority emphasized two criteria: first that the program
was religiously-neutral, and second that it was a program of true
private choice, with parents making independent decisions on where
they wanted to use their children’s scholarships.258 Notwithstanding
the facts that the tuition payments were not segregated between
religious and secular education and that most parents chose
religious schools, the Court held that it did not have a purpose or
primary effect of advancing religion.259
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND BLAINE AMENDMENTS
When the United States Supreme Court approved Ohio’s
educational choice program, the Ohio Supreme Court had already
ruled that the program did not violate the federal Establishment
Clause or Ohio’s Compelled Support Clause.260 Because the Ohio
Constitution lacks a Blaine Amendment, neither supreme court had
to decide the proper scope of a Blaine Amendment or the
interaction between it and various federal protections for religious
liberty.261 But that interaction was present in several cases predating
Zelman.262 Cases after Zelman advocating for educational choice have
sought to get the United States Supreme Court to consider whether
broad interpretations of state Blaine Amendments trample on
federally-protected rights.263 These claims assert that denying
religious school parents or students generally available benefits
violates their Free Speech, Free Exercise, Establishment Clause,264
and Equal Protection rights.265
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 645, 647, 662–63.
260. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 211–12 (Ohio 1999).
261. See KOMER & NEILY, supra note 8, at 65.
262. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 723 n.7 (2004).
263. See Luke A. Lantta, The Post-Zelman Voucher Battleground: Where to Turn after
Federal Challenges to Blaine Amendments Fail, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 214, 214,
221–22 (2004).
264. The test for an Establishment Clause violation considers whether a
program has the purpose or effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Zelman, 536
U.S. at 648–49. While Establishment Clause cases are usually focused on whether a
program advances religion, the principle of religious neutrality prohibits programs
designed to inhibit religion as well. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222–23
(1997).
265. See Lantta, supra note 263, at 221–22, 225 n.83.
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The Supreme Court’s Previous Blaine Cases

The United States Supreme Court has decided three cases
involving state Blaine Amendments,266 although in the only one
involving an educational choice program the Court denied the
provision involved was a Blaine Amendment.267 Trinity Lutheran is the
third of those cases, and the second to hold that a state’s broad
interpretation of a Blaine Amendment infringed federally-protected
rights.268 Proper understanding of the significance of Trinity
Lutheran for educational choice requires an understanding of its
relationship to these earlier cases.
1. Widmar v. Vincent269
The first of these cases, Widmar v. Vincent, like Trinity Lutheran,
arose in Missouri. In the early 1970s, private school parents sought
to use Pierce to require Missouri to support private education.270 In
Brusca v. Missouri, a three-judge federal district court held that “a
parent’s right to choose a religious private school for his children . . .
[did not mean] that the state [was] compelled to finance his child’s
[private school] education.”271 Nor did the parent “have a
constitutional right to any credit for his taxes which support[ed] the
public schools simply because he will not or cannot make use of
them.”272 Similarly, in Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, another three-judge
federal district court held that the state’s refusal to provide free
school bus transportation to private school students did not violate
the students’ equal protection rights because the exclusion was not
irrational.273 The United States Supreme Court summarily affirmed
both decisions.274
266. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012
(2017); Locke, 540 U.S. 712; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
267. Locke, 540 U.S. at 723 n.7 (“[T]he provision in question is not a Blaine
Amendment.”).
268. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024–25.
269. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
270. See Brusca v. Missouri, 332 F. Supp. 275, 277 (D. Mo. 1972), aff’d 405 U.S.
1050 (1971) (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 279.
273. 364 F. Supp. 376, 382 (D. Mo. 1974), aff’d 419 U.S. 888 (1974).
274. Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 419 U.S. 888 (1974) (affirming Luetkemeyer v.
Kaufmann, 364 F. Supp. 376 (D. Mo. 1973)); Brusca v. State Bd. of Educ., 405 U.S.
1050 (1972) (affirming sub nom. Brusca v. Missouri, 332 F. Supp. 275 (D. Mo. 1971)).
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The Widmar plaintiffs were more successful.275 Widmar involved
the University of Missouri, which, as a state agency, is subject to the
federal First Amendment.276 The University made its facilities
generally available to registered student groups, but prohibited the
use of its buildings for religious worship or religious teaching.277 The
Supreme Court held that the Free Speech Clause requires that
regulation of speech be content-neutral.278 The Court rejected the
University’s claim that the policy was justified by the compelling
necessity of avoiding a violation of the Establishment Clause and of
its Blaine Amendment.279 Although the trial court held that the
exclusion was not only justified but required by the Establishment
Clause, the court of appeals and the Supreme Court held that a
religiously-neutral equal access policy did not violate the
Establishment Clause.280 Further, the higher courts held that the
state regulation of speech violated the Free Speech Clause because
it was content-based.281 The Court then rejected the state’s argument
that its interest in achieving greater separation of church and state
than is ensured under the Establishment Clause was sufficiently
compelling to justify content-based discrimination against religious
speech.282
Missouri’s argument for a greater separation of church and state
was based on its Blaine Amendments, as interpreted in Americans
United v. Rogers283 and Paster v. Tussey.284 These Missouri Supreme
Court decisions, discussed previously, held that the Missouri
Constitution285 required a greater separation of church and state
275. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 265.
278. Id. at 277.
279. Id. at 275 (“We agree that the interest of the University in complying with
its constitutional obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not follow,
however, that an ‘equal access’ policy would be incompatible with this Court’s
Establishment Clause cases.”).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 276.
283. 538 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. 1976).
284. 512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1974).
285. MO. CONST. art. I, § 7 provides:
That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or
indirectly, to aid any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid
of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no
preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any
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than that required by the Establishment Clause. The Court
responded as follows:
[T]he state interest asserted here—in achieving greater
separation of church and State than is already ensured
under the Establishment Clause of the Federal
Constitution—is limited by the Free Exercise Clause and in
this case by the Free Speech Clause as well. In this
constitutional context, we are unable to recognize the
State’s interest as sufficiently “compelling” to justify
content-based discrimination against respondents’
religious speech.286
In short, the Court relied on both the Free Exercise Clause and Free
Speech Clause to limit the application of Missouri’s Blaine
Amendments.287
2. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris288
Two years after it decided Mitchell v. Helms, in which the plurality
discussed the anti-Catholic basis of the failed federal Blaine
church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or
worship.
MO. CONST. art. IX, § 8 provides:
Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township,
school district or any other municipal corporation, shall ever make an
appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of
any religious creed, church or sectarian purpose, or to help to support
or sustain any private or public school, academy, seminary, college,
university or other institution of learning controlled by any religious
creed, church or sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any grant
or donation of personal property or real estate ever be made by the state,
or any county, city, town, or other municipal corporation, for any
religious creed, church, or sectarian purpose whatever.
286. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276. Justice Stevens, concurring in the result, said: “If
school facilities may be used to discuss anticlerical doctrine, it seems to me that
comparable use by a group desiring to express a belief in God must also be
permitted.” Id. at 281.
287. In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., the Supreme Court
followed Widmar in another case involving a public university. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
The university defended its denial of publication subsidies to a student group whose
publications reflected its religious perspective as necessary to avoid an
Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 827–28. It did not rely on Virginia’s Blaine
Amendment. The Court held that the university had violated the Free Speech
Clause by discriminating against the organization based on its religious viewpoint.
Id. at 829.
288. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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Amendment,289 the Supreme Court decided Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, a case in which it upheld a scholarship program
against an Establishment Clause challenge.290 The court in Zelman
held that a religiously-neutral educational program in which the
scholarship recipients choose where to use their benefits did not
violate the Establishment Clause, regardless of how many students
choose religious schools.291 Although a Blaine Amendment was not
at issue in Zelman,292 educational choice advocates knew that
opponents would continue to cite state Blaine Amendments to
frustrate efforts to expand educational choice to other states,
particularly those with bad Blaine law.293 Accordingly, they were
heartened when only two years after Zelman the Court decided Locke
v. Davey, a case in which, like Widmar, the state relied on a Blaine
Amendment to deny a student a college scholarship.294
3. Locke v. Davey295
In Locke v. Davey, the Supreme Court considered the question
of whether the Federal Constitution was violated by application of
the Washington Constitution’s Blaine Amendment. Locke was in
many ways quite similar to the Witters case from Washington in

289. 530 U.S. 793, 828–29 (2000) (discussing a proposed constitutional
amendment intended to bar aid to sectarian institutions, which “arose at a time of
pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general, and [when]
it was an open secret that ‘sectarian’ was code for ‘Catholic’”).
290. 536 U.S. at 662 (2002) (“[T]he Ohio program is entirely neutral with
respect to religion. It provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals,
defined only by financial need and residence in a particular school district. It
permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and
private, secular and religious.”).
291. Id.
292. Ohio’s Constitution does not include a Blaine Amendment.
293. The Court’s decision in Zelman did not prevent individual states from
instituting their own stricter rules regarding distribution of voucher funding, and
thereby ultimately left the question open to each state to decide. Michael Hansen,
Beyond Scraped Knees: The Implication of a Missouri Playground on State Voucher Programs,
BROWN CTR. CHALKBOARD (July 12, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/browncenter-chalkboard/2017/07/12/beyond-scraped-knees-the-implications-of-a-misso
uri-playground-on-state-voucher-programs/.
294. Joseph P. Viteritti, Davey’s Plea: Blaine, Blair, Witters, and the Protection of
Religious Freedom, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 299, 299 (2003) (discussing the Locke
case).
295. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
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1986.296 Locke involved higher education and the denial of state aid
to a student pursuing a religious vocation at a religious college.297
And in both cases, the state justified its denial of assistance on the
same provision of the Washington Constitution: article I, section
11.298 This time, however, the plaintiff, Davey, filed his lawsuit in
federal rather than state court.299 He alleged that Washington’s
denial of a scholarship denied his rights to free speech, free exercise
of his religion, and equal protection under federal and state laws.300
Although Davey prevailed at the Ninth Circuit on his Free
Speech claim, the United States Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision,301
reversed that claim and rejected his other claims as well.302
Acknowledging that “there is no doubt that the State could,
consistent with the Federal Constitution, permit Promise Scholars to
pursue a degree in devotional theology,” the Court stated:
The question before us, however, is whether Washington,
pursuant to its own constitution, which has been
authoritatively interpreted as prohibiting even indirectly
funding religious instruction that will prepare students for
296. In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, the United States
Supreme Court unanimously held that Washington did not violate the
Establishment Clause by paying for Witters to pursue a religious vocation at a
religious college. 474 U.S. 481 (1986). The Supreme Court remanded the case back
to the Washington Supreme Court because the Washington Supreme Court had
ruled on the federal Establishment Clause question without ruling on the claim that
paying for Witters’ education separately violated Washington’s Constitution,
specifically article I, section 11. Id. at 489. That provision reads in part as follows:
“[N]o public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious
worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.” Id.
at 484. The Supreme Court stated that “[o]n remand, the state court is of course
free to consider the applicability of the ‘far stricter’ dictates of the Washington State
Constitution.” Id. at 725. The Washington Supreme Court then held that article I,
section 11 did prohibit paying for Mr. Witters’ tuition at the religious college.
Witters v. Washington Comm. for the Blind, 717 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989). Witters
again appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. 493
U.S. 850 (1989).
297. Locke, 540 U.S. at 717.
298. Id. at 716; Witters, 474 U.S. at 484.
299. Locke, 540 U.S. at 716.
300. See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 750 (9th. Cir. 2002).
301. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the opinion, and was joined by the four
more liberal members of the Court, as well as two of the more conservative justices
(Kennedy and O’Connor). Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. Locke, 540 U.S. at
713.
302. Locke, 540 U.S. at 723–34.
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the ministry [in Witters on remand from the U.S. Supreme
Court] . . . can deny them such funding without violating
the Free Exercise Clause.303
The Court found that Washington’s action in denying the
promise scholarship fell within the “play in the joints” between the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses—that “there are some state
actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by
the Free Exercise Clause.”304 The Court rejected the free speech
claim, holding that “[o]ur cases dealing with speech forums are
simply inapplicable,”305 thereby rejecting Davey’s claim that his
exclusion was an unconstitutional viewpoint restriction under
Rosenberger.306 In the same footnote, the Court rejected Davey’s Equal
Protection claim, applying the rational basis test because it found no
violation of the Free Exercise Clause.307
The Court’s primary focus was on Davey’s free exercise claim
that denying him funding violated his right to free exercise of his
religion. Characterizing the state’s action as “merely [having]
chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction,” the Court
concluded that “training for religious professions and training for
secular professions are not fungible,” and that “[t]raining someone
to lead a congregation is an essentially religious endeavor.”308 Noting
that both the federal and state constitutions embody distinct views
on religion that have “no counterpart with respect to other callings
or professions,” the Court stated that the fact that “a State would deal
differently with religious education for the ministry than with
education for other callings is a product of these views [of religion,]
not evidence of hostility towards religion.”309
The Court concluded that the fact that “early state constitutions
saw no problem in explicitly excluding only the ministry from
receiving state dollars reinforces our conclusion that religious
instruction is of a different ilk.”310 In the footnote accompanying this
conclusion, the Court rejected the argument of amici that
“Washington’s Constitution was born of religious bigotry because it

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id. at 719 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Id. at 718–19
Id. at 720 n.3 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 721.
Id.
Id. at 723.
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contains a so-called ‘Blaine Amendment,’ which has been linked
with anti-Catholicism.”311 The “early state constitution[al]”
provisions to which the Court then cites are all “compelled support”
clauses from eight states (Georgia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Delaware, Kentucky, Vermont, Tennessee, and Ohio),312 while the
Washington provision at issue is most certainly not a compelled
support clause, but a Blaine Amendment.313 Professor Mark
DeForrest of Washington’s Gonzaga University Law School has
shown persuasively that “[t]he language of Washington’s Article I,
section 11 closely parallels language that was included in the various
versions of the [federal] Blaine Amendment.”314 This inclusion was
strongly supported by the Washington State Constitutional
Convention, a convention dominated by Republicans loyal, both
personally and ideologically, to the sponsor of the Blaine
Amendment, James Blaine.”315
As discussed previously, while the compelled support clauses
cited by the Locke Court served to prevent states from establishing a
state religion, the state Blaine Amendments served to preserve a
Protestant monopoly over public school funding. One cannot escape
a feeling that the Court’s majority deliberately avoided having to
confront the state Blaine Amendments’ unsavory past in order to
reach its desired result.
4. Post-Locke Developments
In responding to Justice Scalia’s dissent, the Locke majority
asserted that “the only interest at issue [was] the State’s interest in
not funding the religious training of clergy.”316 For those concerned
with the decision’s application to educational choice programs, Locke
fails to answer the obvious question of whether states with Blaine
Amendments can more broadly ban religion from such programs, as
states with bad Blaine law routinely interpret their Blaine
311. Id. at 723 n.7.
312. Id. at 723.
313. See Mark E. DeForrest, Locke v. Davey: The Connection Between the Federal
Blaine Amendment and Article I, § 11 of the Washington State Constitution, 40 TULSA L.
REV. 295, 320 (1974) (“Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s dismissive footnote in
Locke v. Davey, there are very good reasons indeed to consider Art. I, § 11 as a
Blaine amendment provision contained within Washington’s state constitution.”).
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Locke, 540 U.S. at 722 n.5.
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Amendments to do.317 Opponents of educational choice programs
seek a broad reading of Locke, one that prohibits support for
religious education generally, while supporters of educational
choice point to the numerous references in Locke to religious
vocational training. Opponents emphasize the religious elements in
the education offered in religious elementary and secondary
schools, while supporters emphasize that the education offered in
religious schools satisfies all of the state’s legitimate interests in
requiring elementary and secondary education.318
Two cases epitomize the opposing readings of Locke. In Eulitt v.
Maine Department of Education, the First Circuit upheld the exclusion
of religious schools from participation in a Maine program.319 The
program required that school districts not operating elementary or
secondary public schools pay tuition on behalf of their resident
students to whatever public or private school the parents select.320
This system was religiously neutral for nearly 100 years, until the
legislature modified it to comply with a 1980 Maine Attorney
General’s opinion that concluded the Establishment Clause did not
allow parents to use public funds for tuition at religious private
schools.321
Despite the fact that Maine has no state Blaine Amendment and
that the 1980 opinion is clearly wrong post-Zelman, the First Circuit
found permissible the continued discrimination against families
choosing a religious school under Locke. The court stated: “We read
[Locke v.] Davey more broadly [than plaintiffs]: the decision there
recognized that state entities, in choosing how to provide education,
may act upon their legitimate concerns about excessive

317.
318.

See supra notes 187–192 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Silvia Durri, Curtailing the First Amendment Protection to Discovery, 29
TOURO L. REV. 1063, 1066 (2013) (“Thus, Locke illustrates that . . . the State [has]
the ability to provide aid for religious studies without creating excessive
entanglement with religious doctrine.”).
319. 386 F.3d 344, 346 (1st Cir. 2004).
320. Id.
321. See Me. Att’y Gen. OP. No. 80-2 (Jan 7, 1980). See generally Pete Yost, Supreme
Court Rejects a Case Involving Maine School Vouchers, DESERET NEWS (Nov. 28, 2006),
https://www.deseretnews.com/article/650210596/Supreme-Court-rejects-a-caseinvolving-Maine-school-vouchers.html (“In 1980, the state attorney general said the
program violated the U.S. Constitution’s Establishment Clause. The Maine
Legislature made it law in 1983.”).
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entanglement with religion, even though the Establishment Clause
may not require them to do so.”322
In contrast, in Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, a case in
which students at a pervasively religious college were denied state
tuition assistance grants, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with Eulitt’s
broad reading of Locke.323 Despite the fact that the Colorado
constitution has two Blaine Amendments324 and a compelled
support clause,325 the case was brought in federal court because the
Colorado Supreme Court previously interpreted those provisions to
permit aid to students attending religious colleges that were not
pervasively religious.326 While both sides agreed that under Zelman
the Establishment Clause did not require the exclusion, the state
defendants argued that Locke definitively resolved the issue of
whether the state may still choose to exclude such colleges.327 The
Tenth Circuit disagreed:
Although Locke precludes any sweeping argument that the
State may never take the religious character of an activity
into consideration when deciding whether to extend
public funding, the decision does not imply that states are
free to discriminate in funding against religious institutions
however they wish, subject only to a rational basis test.328
The court emphasized several limiting aspects of the Supreme
Court’s decision, concluding that “[t]he opinion thus suggests, even
if it does not hold, that the State’s latitude to discriminate against
religion is confined to certain ‘historic and substantial state
interest[s],’ and does not extend to the wholesale exclusion of
religious institutions and their students from otherwise neutral and
generally available government support.”329

322. Eulitt, 386 F.3d at 355.
323. 534 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008).
324. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 34; Id. art. IX, § 7.
325. Id. art. II, § 4.
326. Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1267–68.
327. Id. at 1254.
328. Id. at 1256.
329. Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1255 (citations omitted). Having rejected
the defendants’ reading of Locke the court invalidated the exclusion as
discriminating among religions and requiring intrusive inquiries into religious
matters protected by the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 1256.
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IV. TRINITY LUTHERAN V. COMER330
The significance of Trinity Lutheran for educational choice
programs lies in the Court’s treatment of Locke and its further
elaboration on just how much play there is in the joint between the
two federal Religion Clauses.331 In Trinity Lutheran, the Court
partially answered the question of whether the states’ latitude to
discriminate against religion extends to the wholesale exclusion of
religious institutions from otherwise neutral and general
government support.332 The facts of the case were simple: Missouri
denied a grant to a church that would have subsidized the church’s
purchase and installation of a rubberized surface on its playground,
solely because the applicant was a church.333 The program was a
competitive one, and the state agency administering the program
determined that the church’s application would have been funded
if the church had been eligible for the program.334
As it had in Widmar, Missouri based its decision on one of the
Blaine Amendments in its state constitution that states “no money
shall be taken from the state treasury . . . in aid of any church.”335 In
response to the church’s claim that the denial of the grant violated
its rights under the Free Exercise Clause, the federal district court
explained that the Free Exercise Clause “prohibits the government
from outlawing or restricting the exercise of a religious practice, but
it generally does not prohibit withholding an affirmative benefit on
account of religion.”336 Although Trinity Lutheran was not an
educational choice case, the trial court found the case “nearly
indistinguishable from Locke [v. Davey],” an educational choice case,
and held that the Free Exercise Clause was not violated.337

330. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012
(2017).
331. See id. at 2015.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 2014.
334. Id. at 2017.
335. MO. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“That no money shall ever be taken from the public
treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, or denomination of
religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and
that no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any
church, sect, or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship.”).
336. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2014.
337. Trinity Lutheran Church v. Pauley, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1151 (W.D. Mo.
2013).
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In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Eighth Circuit also
relied on Locke, concluding that while it was clear that the
Establishment Clause did not bar the grant to the church, Missouri
did not have to disregard the stricter antiestablishment concerns
reflected in its state constitution.338 Circuit Judge Gruender
dissented to the panel majority, distinguishing Locke as concerning
the narrow issue of funding the religious training of clergy, and “not
leav[ing] states with unfettered discretion to exclude the religious
from generally available public benefits.”339
The Supreme Court reversed in a 7-2 decision, with the dissent
written by Justice Sotomayor and joined by Justice Ginsburg.340 Six
justices joined Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion, although two
of those justices—Gorsuch and Thomas—refused to join one of his
footnotes that disclaimed any implications for other programs,
including those designed for educational choice.341 Justice Breyer
concurred in the judgment in a brief opinion that emphasized “the
particular nature of the ‘public benefit’” involved.342 He harkened
back to Everson’s statement that the state cannot exclude individuals
because of their faith from receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation, such as ordinary police and fire protection.343
Characterizing the program at issue as one “designed to secure or
improve the health or safety of children,” he noted that “[p]ublic
benefits come in many shapes and sizes” and concluded that he
“would leave the application of the Free Exercise Clause to other
kinds of public benefits for another day.”344 His opinion does not
mention Locke v. Davey.345
338. Trinity Lutheran Church v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 2015).
339. Id. at 791.
340. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2027.
341. Id. at 2016.
342. Id. at 2026 (explaining he saw no significant difference between cutting off
church schools from general government services and participation in general
programs designed to secure or improve children’s health).
343. Id. at 2027 (Breyer, J., concurring).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 2026–27. In her lengthy dissent, Justice Sotomayor found: “The
Establishment Clause does not allow Missouri to grant the Church’s funding request
because the Church uses the Learning Center, including its playground, in
conjunction with its religious mission.” Id. at 2028 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Sotomayor continued, “[t]he conclusion that the funding the Church seeks would
impermissibly advance religion is inescapable.” Id. at 2029. Consequently, she does
not view the Missouri provision in question as more expansive than the
Establishment Clause, as applied to the program in question. Id. at 2030. Sotomayor
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Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion takes a substantially
broader approach than Breyer’s concurrence and contains an
extended discussion of Locke.346 The majority decision noted that
“[t]he parties agree that the Establishment Clause of [the First]
Amendment does not prevent Missouri from including Trinity
Lutheran in the Scrap Tire Program.”347 The Court then considered
whether the denial fell into the “‘play in the joints’ between what the
Establishment Clause permits and the Free Exercise Clause
compels,” in the words of Locke.348 Relying on a line of Free Exercise
cases, the Court emphasized language from Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, that “the Free Exercise Clause protects
against laws that ‘impos[e] special disabilities on the basis of . . .
religious status.’”349 The majority stated that the denial of a public
benefit to an otherwise eligible recipient solely because of the
recipients’ religious character “imposes a penalty on the free
exercise of religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny.”350 The
Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the penalty is a denial
of a subsidy and does not resolve the free exercise question. The
Court stated that “[t]he express discrimination against religious
exercise here is not the denial of a grant, but rather the refusal to
allow the Church—solely because it is a Church—to compete with
secular organizations for a grant.”351
The majority then rejected the defendant’s argument that the
free exercise question is controlled by Locke, as the trial and appellate
courts had found.352 In discussing Locke, the Trinity Lutheran Court
emphasized the narrowness of that decision, starting with the fact
that the plaintiff in that case was discriminated against, not because
of who he was, but because of what he proposed to do—use the funds

does, however, distinguish Zelman: “Because Missouri decides which Scrap Tire
Program applicants receive state funding, this case does not implicate a line of
decisions about indirect aid programs in which aid reaches religious institutions
‘only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals.’” Id.
at 2029 n.2 (quoting Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002)).
346. Id. at 2023–25.
347. Id. at 2019.
348. Id. (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004)).
349. Id. (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 533 (1993)).
350. Id. at 2021.
351. Id. at 2022.
352. Id. at 2023.
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to prepare for the ministry.353 The Court characterized this as “an
essentially religious endeavor,” one “that lay at the historic core of
the Religion Clauses.”354 Moreover, the Court emphasized, “the
[Locke] Court took account of Washington’s antiestablishment
interest only after determining that the scholarship program did not
‘require students to choose between their religious beliefs and
receiving a government benefit.’”355 The Court elaborated on this
point:
As the [Locke] Court put it, Washington’s scholarship
program went “a long way toward including religion in its
benefits.” Students in the program were free to use their
scholarships at “pervasively religious schools.” Davey could
use his scholarship to pursue a secular degree at one
institution while studying devotional theology at another.
He could also use his scholarship money to attend a
religious college and take devotional theology courses
there. The only thing he could not do was use the
scholarship to pursue a degree in that subject.356
The Trinity Lutheran Court thus found express discrimination
against religious exercise that put the applicant Church to a choice
between its religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.
This triggered a requirement that it withstand “the strictest
scrutiny,”357 which the Court also called the “most exacting
scrutiny”358 and the “most rigorous scrutiny.”359 The Court then
evaluated whether the state had carried its burden, concluding that
it had not done so:
Under that stringent standard, only a state interest “of the
highest order” can justify the Department’s discriminatory
policy. Yet the Department offers nothing more than
Missouri’s policy preference for skating as far as possible
from religious establishment concerns. In the face of the
clear infringement on free exercise before us, that interest
cannot qualify as compelling. As we said when considering
Missouri’s same policy preference on a prior occasion, “the
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 2016 (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720–21 (2004)).
356. Id. at 2023–24 (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 724) (citations omitted).
357. Id. at 2022.
358. Id. at 2021.
359. Id. at 2024 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993)) (footnote omitted).
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state interest asserted here—in achieving greater
separation of church and State than is already ensured
under the Establishment Clause of the Federal
Constitution—is limited by the Free Exercise Clause.”360
Finally, the Court concluded that, despite the consequences of
the exclusion being “in all likelihood, a few extra scraped knees . . .
the exclusion of Trinity Lutheran from a public benefit for which it
is otherwise qualified, solely because it is a church, is odious to our
Constitution all the same, and cannot stand.”361
In a footnote, the Court stated, “this case involves express
discrimination based on religious identity with respect to playground
resurfacing. We do not address religious uses of funding or other
forms of discrimination.”362 Both Justice Gorsuch and Justice
Thomas refused to join the footnote, based on concerns that the
footnote might lead readers to mistake how narrowly the Court had
read Locke. Justice Gorsuch expressed two concerns. First, he
objected that “the Court leaves open the possibility” that “a useful
distinction might be drawn between laws that discriminate on the
basis of religious status and religious use.”363 Here, he viewed the Free
Exercise Clause as guaranteeing “the free exercise of religion, not just
the right to inward belief (or status).”364 He found that reliance on
the status-use distinction was insufficient to distinguish Locke, stating,
“[i]f that case can be correct and distinguished, it seems it might be
only because of the opinion’s claim of a long tradition against the
use of public funds for the training of the clergy.”365
Second, Justice Gorsuch criticized the footnote because he
worried “that some might mistakenly read it to suggest that only
‘playground resurfacing’ cases, or only those with some association
with children’s safety or health, or perhaps some other social good
we find sufficiently worthy, are governed by the legal rules recounted
in and faithfully applied by the Court’s opinion.”366 He concluded
that “the general principles here do not permit discrimination

360. Id. (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981)) (citations
omitted).
361. Id. at 2024–25.
362. Id. at 224 n.3.
363. Id. at 2025 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
364. Id. at 2026 (emphasis added).
365. Id.
366. Id.
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against religious exercise—whether on the playground or anywhere
else.”367
Justice Thomas, who dissented in Locke with Justice Scalia,368
took issue with what he referred to as the “Court’s endorsement in
Locke of even a ‘mild kind[]’ of discrimination against religion.”369
Ultimately, “because the Court today appropriately construes Locke
narrowly, and because no party has asked us to reconsider it,” Justice
Thomas concurred in all of the Court’s opinion except for footnote
three, for the reasons expressed in Justice Gorsuch’s opinion.370
In summary, Trinity Lutheran shows two justices discontented
with Locke (Justices Gorsuch and Thomas) and potentially prepared
to overrule it in a case involving an educational choice program.371
A third justice (Justice Breyer) concurred in the judgment in Trinity
Lutheran on a very narrow ground, characterizing the program
involved as one to improve the health and safety of children and
“leav[ing] the application of the Free Exercise clause to other kinds
of public benefits for another day.”372 The two dissenting justices
viewed Missouri’s action as justified under the federal Establishment
Clause because it provided aid directly to a church but left open how
they would view an educational choice case like the scholarship
program involved in Zelman.373 The remaining four justices (Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, and Kennedy), like Justices
Thomas and Gorsuch, gave a narrow reading to Locke. This reading
emphasized language in that decision about how the program
involved did not exclude religion (and religious people) in general
from its benefits, by allowing scholarship recipients to attend
pervasively sectarian colleges and study devotional religion.374

367. Id.
368. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725–34 (2004).
369. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 720)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 2027.
373. See id. at 2030–31; see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 639
(2002).
374. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025–26; Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725
(2004).
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF TRINITY LUTHERAN FOR FUTURE EDUCATIONAL
CHOICE LITIGATION
As occurred in Locke,375 several amici briefs to the Supreme
Court discussed the state constitutional provision in question as an
anti-Catholic Blaine Amendment.376 None of the four opinions
discussed this fact, but at least unlike Locke, the Court did not simply
erroneously deny that the provision in question was a Blaine.377 By
narrowing the interpretation of Locke, however, the Court has
narrowed the “play in the joints” between the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses that has allowed the supposed
“antiestablishment concerns” of state Blaine Amendments to limit
the full scope of the Free Exercise Clause.378
The Locke Court tied the outcome of Equal Protection Clause
analysis to the Free Exercise Clause.379 Thus, school choice advocates
can only be heartened by the recognition that six members of the
Court have acknowledged the discriminatory nature of excluding
churches from generally available public benefit programs.380 This
recognition should bode well for educational choice advocates in
cases where state Blaine Amendments prohibit the participation of
students whose families want to use scholarships to attend religious
schools. If it is discriminatory to exclude churches from neutral
programs, it is at least equally discriminatory to exclude families by
excluding the religious schools they choose.381 It is one thing to link
vocational training for the clergy to antiestablishment interests
going beyond the Establishment Clause, given the historical
concerns about public funding of clergy. It is quite another when the
antiestablishment concerns were “born of [anti-Catholic] bigotry,”

375. Brief of United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, North Park
Theological Seminary, the Worldwide Church of God, and Clifton Kirkpatrick, as
Stated Clerk of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) as Amici Curiae in support of
Respondent, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315), 2003 WL
22087619.
376. See, e.g., Brief for the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae at 26–35, Trinity
Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (No. 15-577).
377. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 725.
378. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2032.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 639 (2002).
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and served to protect a Protestant monopoly over public education
funding for public schools that were generically Protestant.382
Moreover, while the Supreme Court avoided consideration of
the Free Speech Clause in Locke by baldly stating that denial of
funding to pursue vocational theology degrees did not involve an
unconstitutional viewpoint restriction on speech,383 elementary and
secondary schools are a way in which parents teach their children.
This is true whether the parents allow the government to teach their
children in public schools, whether the parents teach directly by
homeschooling, or whether they choose private schools. Educational
choice programs subsidize the children’s education, and, by allowing
parents to choose from multiple viewpoints, appear to create a
limited public forum in which viewpoint discrimination is possible.
Rosenberger and the public forum cases on which it is based should
not permit elimination of the religious viewpoint.384 Educational
choice programs appear to be another situation in which the free
exercise and free speech analyses lead to the same conclusion.
We may not have long to wait for an answer to the question of
whether the broad interpretation of Blaine Amendments must be
cut back to conform to the Federal Constitution’s protection for free
exercise, free speech, and equal protection. Immediately after it
issued its Trinity Lutheran decision, the Court granted review of,
reversed, and remanded two cases from state supreme courts that
involved state Blaine Amendments and educational programs.385
Petitions for certiorari in these cases were held, pending the
long-delayed decision in Trinity Lutheran.386
The first of these cases filed with the Court came from the
Colorado Supreme Court and involves one of its Blaine
382. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829 (2000).
383. Locke, 540 U.S. at 720 n.3.
384. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 819
(1995).
385. See Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 461 (Colo.
2015), rev’d sub nom. Doyle v. Taxpayers for Pub. Educ., 137 S. Ct. 2324 (2017)
(remanding for consideration in light of Trinity Lutheran); Moses v. Skandera, 367
P.3d 838 (N.M. 2015), rev’d sub nom. N.M. Assoc. of Non-Public Sch. v. Moses, 137 S.
Ct. 2325 (2017) (remanding for consideration in light of Trinity Lutheran).
386. The death of Justice Scalia occurred after certiorari was granted in Trinity
Lutheran, and the case was one of several delayed by a desire to have a fully staffed
Court. See Amy Howe, Argument Preview: More Than Just a Playground Dispute, SCOTUS
BLOG (Apr. 12, 2017 11:08 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/04/argumentpreview-just-playground-dispute/.
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Amendments: article IX, section 7.387 In Taxpayers for Public Education
v. Douglas County School District, the Colorado Supreme Court
invalidated a scholarship program enacted by a school district.388
Three of the seven justices held it violated article IX, section 7
because it aided or supported religious schools, even though the
beneficiaries of the scholarships were the eligible families.389 A
fourth justice joined the plurality in invalidating the program on the
basis that it violated an unrelated state statute.390 Three justices
dissented, arguing that an earlier Colorado Supreme Court decision
had already held that programs providing grants to students did not
violate this provision.391
Remand of the Taxpayers for Public Education decision squarely
raised the question of whether excluding religious schools from
those at which students may use their scholarships violates the
federal free exercise, free speech, and equal protection rights of the
students and their parents. Unfortunately, however, the Colorado
Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot after the school board
rescinded the scholarship program.392
The second case the Supreme Court remanded, Moses v.
Skandera,393 came from the Supreme Court of New Mexico and
involved article XII, section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution.394

387. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7 reads as follows:
Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township,
school district or other public corporation, shall ever make any
appropriation, or pay from any public fund or moneys whatever,
anything in aid of any church or sectarian society, or for any sectarian
purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, academy, seminary,
college, university or other literary or scientific institution, controlled by
any church or sectarian denomination whatsoever; nor shall any grant
or donation of land, money or other personal property, ever be made by
the state, or any such public corporation to any church, or for any
sectarian purpose.
388. 351 P.3d 461 (Colo. 2015). The Institute for Justice, which employs the
author of this article, represents parents who have intervened on the side of the
defendants, the school district, and the state board of education.
389. See id. at 475.
390. Id. (Marquez, J., concurring in the judgement).
391. Id. at 480–87 (Eid, J., dissenting in part)
392. Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 356 P.3d 833 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2013).
393. 367 P.3d 838 (N.M. 2015).
394. N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 3 (“[N]o part of the proceeds arising from the sale
or disposal of any lands granted to the state by congress, or any other funds
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This case involves lending secular textbooks for free to students in
private schools—similar to the issue addressed by the New York
Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court in Board of
Education v. Allen.395 The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected the
argument that the textbooks benefited the students rather than the
schools and invalidated the program.396 Article XII, section 3 is
undoubtedly a Blaine Amendment, but unusual in that it prohibits
aid to private secular as well as sectarian schools.397 The majority of
private schools in New Mexico are religious schools,398 but the New
Mexico Supreme Court may on remand assert that the line drawn in
its Constitution is between public schools, colleges, and universities
on the one hand and all private schools, colleges, and universities on
the other. A decision invalidating the textbook program on this basis
could substantially affect the likelihood of further review by the
United States Supreme Court. Nonetheless, assuming the public
schools of New Mexico were generically Protestant in orientation
when the provision was adopted, one can argue that the line actually
drawn in this constitutional provision was a line drawn to protect a
Protestant public school monopoly from the historically sectarian
(largely Catholic) schools.
Additionally, a third case involving an educational choice
program and a broad interpretation of a Blaine Amendment is
currently pending appeal in the Montana Supreme Court. That case,
Espinoza v. Department of Revenue,399 involves a state tax credit for
donations to private scholarship funds.400 Although there are many
such tax credit choice programs,401 they are challenged much less
appropriated, levied or collected for educational purposes, shall be used for the
support of any sectarian denominational, or private school, college, or university.”)
395. 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
396. Moses, 367 P.3d at 849.
397. N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 3.
398. New Mexico Private Schools, PRIV. SCH. REV. (last visited Mar. 31, 2018),
https://www.privateschoolreview.com/new-mexico (stating that 63% of private
schools are “religiously affiliated”).
399. Appeal docketed, No. DA 17-0492 (Mont. Aug. 17, 2017) (State of Montana
Office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court Docket Search), https://supremecourtdo
cket.mt.gov/search/case?case=20598. The author represents the parents in
Espinoza.
400. Brief for Appellant at 1–2, Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, appeal
docketed, No. DA 17-0492 (Mont. Aug. 17, 2017).
401. See James G. Blaine: Who Was He, and How Is He Affecting Children’s Education
Today?, EDCHOICE (May 24, 2016), https://www.edchoice.org/blog/james-g-blaineaffecting-childrens-education-today/. There are twenty-one tax-credit-generated
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frequently—and so far never successfully—than government
scholarship programs, because they do not involve appropriations of
public money.402 A challenge to one such program under the
Establishment Clause was rejected by the United States Supreme
Court in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn in
2011.403 The Court held that because no appropriation of taxpayer
funds was involved, the taxpayer plaintiffs lacked standing to sue
under Flast v. Cohen,404 which created an exception for taxpayers to
allege Establishment Clause violations where public funds were
involved.
Montana has a fairly typical Blaine Amendment in its
constitution in article X, section 6.405 After the legislature enacted
the tax credit-generated scholarship program in 2015, the
Department of Revenue relied on article X, section 6 to issue an
scholarship programs in seventeen states. Nine of those states have Blaine
Amendments. Martin F. Luken & Michael Shaw, School Choice Fallacies: Disproving
Detractors’ Allegations Against Tax-Credit Scholarship Programs, EDCHOICE (2017),
https://www.edchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/2017-7-Tax-CreditBrief.pdf.
402. Gaddy v. Ga. Dep’t of Revenue, 802 S.E.2d 225 (Ga. 2017); Magee v. Boyd,
175 So.3d 79 (Ala. 2015); Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999); McCall v.
Scott, 199 So.3d 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016); Griffith v. Bower, 747 N.E.2d 423
(Ill. App. Ct. 2001), cert. denied, 755 N.E.2d 477 (Ill. 2001); Toney v. Bower 744
N.E.2d 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001), cert. denied, 754 N.E.2d 1293 (Ill. 2001). In addition
to these educational choice cases, other appellate and supreme courts have
concluded that tax credits are not payments of public funds. See Manzara v. State,
343 S.W.3d 656 (Mo. 2011); Tax Equity All. for Mass., Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue,
516 N.E.2d 152 (Mass. 1987); State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 162 Cal. App.
4th 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Olson v. State, 742 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
403. 563 U.S. 125 (2011).
404. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
405. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6 reads as follows:
(1) The legislature, counties, cities, towns, school districts, and
public corporations shall not make any direct or indirect
appropriation or payment from any public fund or monies, or
any grant of lands or other property for any sectarian purpose
or to aid any church, school, academy, seminary college,
university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled in
whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination.
(2) This section shall not apply to funds received from federal
sources provided to the state for the express purpose of
distribution to non-public education.
Subsection (2) was added to this section when the 1972 Constitution was adopted
to replace Montana’s original 1889 Constitution. LARRY M. ELLISON & FRITZ SNYDER,
THE MONTANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 182 (2001).

2018]

THE FUTURE OF EDUCATIONAL CHOICE

611

administrative rule excluding all religious schools from
participation, meaning that students receiving scholarships could
use them only at non-religious schools.406 Three parents who sent
their children to a Christian private school sued the Department of
Revenue, arguing the program is not subject to section 6 because it
is aiding them as private individuals rather than aiding the schools
they choose for their children’s education.407 The trial court agreed
with the parents and enjoined the administrative rule, and the
Department of Revenue has filed an appeal with the Montana
Supreme Court.408
VI. CONCLUSION
In both of these pending cases, state Blaine Amendments have
had a pernicious effect of denying parents support for their
educational choices. After Zelman, there is no serious argument that
the programs at issue violate the Establishment Clause. Thus,
whatever antiestablishment interest the states have in enforcing a
stricter separation of church and state than the Federal Constitution
derives from these state provisions. In 2000, the four justices of the
plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms recognized that the federal
Blaine Amendment had its roots in anti-Catholic bigotry.409 But the
Court as a whole has failed to recognize and address the similar
motivation behind the state constitutional antecedents of that failed
amendment and its progeny in the state constitutions. Under the
Supreme Court’s precedent, such as Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
governmental action directed at disfavoring particular religions,
which is precisely what the state and federal Blaine Amendments are,
is plainly forbidden by the Free Exercise Clause.410
406. See MONT ADMIN. R. 42.4.802 (2015) (removing churches, academies,
seminaries, colleges, universities, literary or scientific institutions, or any other
sectarian institutions owned or controlled in whole or in part by any church,
religious sect, or denomination—or its employee(s)—from being classified as a
“qualified education provider,” for which education donation tax credits would be
permitted).
407. See Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at
1–5, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, No. DV-15-1152A (Mont. Dist. Ct. May
13, 2016) (on file with author).
408. Espinoza v. Dep’t of Revenue, Mont. Sup. Ct. No. DA 17-0492 (appeal filed
Aug. 17, 2017). The Montana Supreme Court hearing took place on April 6, 2018.
409. 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000).
410. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
547 (1993).
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The Supreme Court’s failure to confront broadly interpreted
state Blaine Amendments has allowed state interpretations of these
provisions to limit parents’ ability to pursue private school
alternatives to public education. But, ironically, public schools
originated as generically Protestant in orientation at a time when
Protestants and Catholics were united in agreement on the
importance of including religion as a component of education.411
The effects of this failure have thus morphed over time from
discrimination against Catholics wanting a religion-based education
for their children to discrimination against parents of any religious
denomination wanting such an education.412 The Supreme Court’s
test for Establishment Clause violations has long barred government
action having the purpose or effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion.413 But, the Court has honored the “inhibiting” language in
the breach. This has left the Free Exercise Clause and sometimes the
Free Speech Clause to carry the weight of protecting religious people
and organizations from governmental discrimination, under which
the Court has pursued an uncertain course where state Blaine
Amendments are involved.
On the one hand, the Court in Widmar refused to allow Missouri
to use a Blaine Amendment to deny religious organizations the free
space on college campuses it provided to secular organizations.414
On the other hand, the Court in Locke allowed Washington to use its
Blaine Amendment to deny a merit-based scholarship to a student
pursuing a religious vocation, with the Court majority dodging the
obvious fact that the provision in question was a Blaine
Amendment.415 With its recent decision in Trinity Lutheran, the
Court appears to have signaled that it reads Locke narrowly, as limited
to pursuit of religious vocations.416 Unlike Trinity Lutheran, which
411. See, e.g., JORGENSON, supra note 45, at 216–21 (observing that both Catholics
and Protestants viewed the American education system as the primary means for
“socializ[ing] children into a specific value system, the core of which consisted of
the faith and teaching of the Church”).
412. See generally id. at 132–36 (discussing how, by the early 1900s, state courts
were no longer deferring to local school board determinations regarding the
validity of reading the Bible as vital curriculum).
413. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
414. See generally Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264–67 (1981).
415. See generally Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. at 712.
416. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,
2024–25 (2017).
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involved aid provided directly to a church (rather than aid provided
to students and their families), the pending New Mexico and
Montana cases involving Blaine Amendments warrant further
analysis from the Supreme Court. In these cases, opponents are
likely to argue that states may impose their Blaine Amendments as
barriers to constitutional educational choice programs. But if such
reasoning is accepted, it would have a crippling effect in many states
on educational choice and the rights of children to self-select a
religious education if and when they so desire. Nevertheless, Trinity
Lutheran represents a major step forward for advocates seeking to
overturn broad state Blaine Amendments as barriers to true
educational choice.
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